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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether attorneys fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which the 
Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah, 1998 
This issue was raised at the Trial Court Level at Record 1363 and following. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." 
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THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution provides: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case in this Appeal is very simple and straight forward and that is 
whether the Trial Court should have awarded attorneys fees and all costs incurred to the 
Defendant. Appellant submits that attorneys fees should have been awarded for several reasons 
based upon two statutory provisions and also under the Utah State Constitution as well as the 
United States Constitution. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In this action the Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking Defendant's property. After the 
Complaint was served, Plaintiff sought an Order of Immediate Occupancy so that they could 
have possession of the Defendant's property and proceed with their development. The District 
Court Judge took four days of evidence and then denied the Motion for Immediate Occupancy. 
Salt Lake County then moved to dismiss the case which the Court granted. 
The District Court then ruled that the Defendant was entitled to Attorneys Fees and 
Costs. 
Salt Lake County then immediately moved the Court to set aside its own Order of 
Dismissal and to allow Salt Lake County to file an Amended Complaint. 
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The Trial Court granted both motions and then heard the Amended Complaint on the 
merits and after considering all of the facts and the law, dismissed the Plaintiffs Complaint with 
prejudice. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court granted limited costs and no attorneys fees to the Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on September 24, 2007l seeking to condemn 0.018 acres2 
of Defendant's property3 located on Lot #1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision,4 for an alleged 
purpose of creating a safer turnaround5 for vehicles coming to the end of the road in Pinecrest, 
Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation was served with the 
Summons on September 24, 20076 and so from date of service to the time of the final Order, 
Judgment and Decree being signed by the Honorable Robert Faust, on August 16, 2011,7 (Tab C) 
Salt Lake County had tied up the Defendant's water tanks, water works and hundreds of 
Defendant's residential lots for almost four (4) years.8 (Tab I, Finding #11) 
3. The matter came on for hearing on the Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy on 
May 8, 2008,9 May 9, 2008,10June 6, 200811 and June 10, 2008.12 
4. Following this evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the Motion for Immediate 
Occupancy13 and after making numerous Findings of Fact, made the following Conclusions of 
Law14 as to location of the subject turnaround on Defendant's property: (Tab I) 
"25. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not located the subject 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as 
required by 78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
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26. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not located the subject 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good as 
required by 78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
27. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has acted arbitrarily as 
contemplated in Salt Lake County vs. Rammoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1977). 
28. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because there is no need for the taking and the taking is not 
necessary as contemplated in Salt Lake County vs. Rammoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 
1977) and as set out in the Utah Code Annotated 78-34-4. 
29. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has abused its discretion in the 
proposed taking as contemplated in Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975). 
30. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not acted reasonably nor in 
good faith in the proposed taking as contemplated in UDOT vs. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 
(Utah, 1979) also Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975)." 
5. After the Trial Court's ruling, Salt Lake County moved the Court to dismiss the action 
without prejudice15 (Tab G) which the Court granted and then the Court awarded costs and 
attorneys fees to the Defendant pursuant to 78-34-16 of the Utah Code Annotated.16 
6. Before the Trial Court determined the amount of fees and costs that were to be 
awarded to the Defendant, Salt Lake County moved to set aside their Order of Dismissal and 
moved to amend their Complaint.17 
7. The Amended Complaint changed the size and shape of the proposed taking to the 
sum of 0.003 acre, but still located the same over the Defendant's property exactly where it 
would tie up the Defendant's water tanks, water works and hundreds of Defendant's residential 
lots.1* (Tab X) 
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8. The Trial Court then completed this matter by having a trial on all remaining issues on 
February 1620andl7,21 2011. 
9. On March 15,2011, the Trial Count made the following ruling:22 
".. .the Court finds that the County's amended design of the proposed turnaround 
is not the most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and 
was done without adequately considering the impact on the adjoining lands, use of 
adjoining land to effectuate a turnaround, the water system currently in place, and the 
parking situation and its impact on future development." (Tab F) 
10. Defendant thereafter sought attorneys fees and costs23 and the trial court granted 
limited costs and no attorneys fees24 (Tab D) from which the Defendant appeals.25 (Tab B) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This case is about attorneys fees and costs in an eminent domain action. Plaintiff 
brought this action seeking 0.018 acre of the Defendant's property which was squarely 
over the Defendant's water tanks and water works. Five sixths of this proposed taking 
was for snow storage. 
The Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course of four days and 
then denied the Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy and in doing so, entered 
Conclusions of Law that Salt Lake County (l)"has not acted reasonably nor in good 
faith;" (2) "has abused its discretion" (3) not established a "need for the taking and the 
taking is not necessary;" (4) "has acted arbitrarily" (5) "has not located the subject 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good" and 
(6) "has not located the subject turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible 
with the least private injury." 
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Plaintiff then m o v e d to dismiss without prejudice and the Trial Court dismissed 
the action and awarded attorneys fees t o the Defendant pursuant to ' 78-34 16 I Jtah C o d e 
A n n o t a t e d . B e f o r e 11n: I riiil ( 'nurl tlefeniiiiied Hie iiiiiotinu oil die lees Sail I «JU oinih 
m o v e d to set aside its Order o f Dismissa l and amend its Complaint and the Trial Court 
granted the same. 
w a s pinpoint right over the water tanks and water works and this t ime not seeking any o f 
Defendant 's property for s n o w storage. 
I he I rial Coi irt coi lducted tl le tt ial oi 1J ""ebi uar> 16 ai id 1 1 , 2011 and then 
dismissed the P la in t i f f s Complaint with prejudice. 
At the Trial Court level Defendant sought attorneys fees and costs and the Trial 
Court granted l imited costs and no attorneys fees, from which Order the Defendant 
appeals. 
Appellant argues that it is entitled to attorneys fees and costs in seven different 
arguments and then an eighth argument for attorneys fees and costs on appeal. 
'Vi't'iiiiii'iill ( hie s eeks a ( (on i e \ s Ices mi (In h.iMs llhil lite .teflon was w illlm mil inet i t 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
This Argument, made pursuant to 7 8 - 2 7 - 5 6 Utah Code Annotated, is based upon 
the fii idii igb> the I i: ial C :>i n t tl lat 1:1 ic actioi i v;v as i ;n u i leritorious and tl lat Salt Lake 
County had not acted in good faith as reflected in the Sixth Coi lch isi< >n < )f I aw 1 vhich 
states: 
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30. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not acted reasonably 
nor in good faith in the proposed taking as contemplated in UDOT vs. Fuller, 603 
P.2d 814, (Utah, 1979) also Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975). 
Argument Two seeks attorneys fees on the basis of 78-34-15 Utah Code 
Annotated, which was the same basis the Trial Court granted attorneys fees after the 
Motion for Immediate Occupancy was denied. 
Appellant claims that the action of Salt Lake County to amend its complaint and 
seek 0.003 acre was merely a pretext to get around the provisions of 78-34-16 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
Argument Three seeks attorneys fees on the basis of 78-27-56 Utah Code 
Annotated and Cadv vs. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1983) on the basis that the action 
was without merit and not asserted in good faith during the course of the litigation, 
including but not limited to: (1) Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief in the 
propriety of their activities during the course of the trial; (2) Salt Lake County fully 
intended to take unconscionable advantage of Defendant and (3) Salt Lake County clearly 
intended to and had knowledge of the fact that its actions would hinder, delay and 
defraud the Defendant. 
Appellant claims that there was no witness, no exhibit, no report, no study, etc., 
not even a scintilla of evidence to support the need for the 0.003 acre right over the water 
tanks and water works of the Defendant. 
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Appellant submits that the stemming from the Court when the Court denied the 
Motion for Immediate Occupancy is almost word for word the same as the Court ruled on 
the wl lole i nattei 01 i It le i inic: rits 
Please note that Salt Lake County withdrew its claim for snow storage and snow 
removal after the Motion for Immediate Occupancy was denied. 
\il I In; i/'iiill ml (In; firsl loin d;i\s ol (mini llie Honoublr Kohul ll'aust WIN ilk in Ins 
Minute Entry at page 480B of the Record: 
"After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the hearing, the 
Court finds that the County designed the proposed turnaround without adequately 
considering the impact on the adjoining land, the water systems currently in place, 
the burden of additional snow storage on the Defendant's property, and the 
parking situation and its resulting impact on further development." 
At the end of the fifth and sixth days of trial, the Honorable Robert Faust, wrote in 
his Minute Entry at page 1 ^v >f the Record: (Note Salt Lake County withdrew its claim 
of need for >» - •• *-J* -^" 
"After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the hearing, the 
Court finds that the County's amended design of the proposed turnaround is not 
the most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and 
was done without adequately considering the impact on the adjoining lands, use of 
adjoining lands to effectuate a turnaround, the water system currently in place, and 
the parking situation and its impact on future development." 
Appellant submits that there should be no wonder why the Trial Court ruled the 
same as there was no difference in the "testimony and evidence" as Andrea Pullos merely 
this, there was nothing different submitted to the Court. 
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Argument Four seeks attorneys fees on the basis of 78-27-56 Utah Code 
Annotated and Cadv vs. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1983) on the basis that the action 
was without merit and not asserted in good faith outside of the litigation, including but 
not limited to: (1) Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief in the propriety of their 
activities during the course of the trial; (2) Salt Lake County fully intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of Defendant and (3) Salt Lake County clearly intended to and 
had knowledge of the fact that its actions would hinder, delay and defraud the Defendant. 
Argument Five seeks attorneys fees on the basis that Salt Lake County has a 
history of abuse in reference to the exercise of its power of eminent domain. 
Here the Appellant produced uncontroverted evidence of how Salt Lake County 
had sought to harm the Defendant over the course of fifteen years plus through several 
eminent domain actions. 
Lonnie Johnson, Administrative Assistant to Salt Lake County Councilman at 
Large, Randy Horiuchi, testified that this action "was unfair because it was part of 
harassment against Walsh by the County" for more than 15 years. This too was 
uncontroverted. 
Argument Sixth seeks attorneys fees on the basis of the Fifth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Appellant claims that this action amounts to an unconstitutional taking without 
just compensation and that it deprives the Defendant of its property without due process 
of law. 
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Argument Seven seeks attorneys fees on the basis of Section 22 of the Utah State 
Constitution which states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
withoi it j 1 ist compel isatioi i 
This argument is based upon the fact that Salt Lake County significantly damaged 
the Defendant by tying up its water tanks, water works and the development of hundreds 
ul'ilji residcnlml lols loi iilmosl loin \e<ns \ppt'llant cl.iiiiis llul these loin suns sliirlul 
when the real estate market was at an all time high and ended with the market at an all 
time low and therefore the damages to the Defendant are permanent and "astronomical" 
( N < >1 e Finding of Fact #19) 
Argument Eight seeks attorneys fees mid eosls on appeal 
This is based upon the claim that attorneys fees should have been awarded by the 
Trial Court and if awarded at the lower Court level then they should also be awarded on 
appeal. ; • 
Appellant submits that it is most significant that it was Andrea Pullos herself, the 
Traffic Engineer from Salt Lake County, who provided the Court with the evidence that 
defeated the 1^  lotioi i for Ii i imediate Occi ipai ic> ( 1 ab I) 
Similarl), it was Andrea Pullos' notes, obtained by the Defendant through 
discovery that provided the Court with the evidence that caused the Court to dismiss Salt 
I <ake Coi int> ' s Con lplah it w < itl I pi eji idice ( I ab X ai id I ab Z) 
It has been Lonnie Johnson, Administrative Assistant to Randy Horiuclii Salt 
Lake County Councilman at Large, who supplied the Court with the evidence that this 
action was asserted subjectively in bad faith. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AFTER THE COURT 
DENIED THE MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY WAS WELL 
FOUNDED IN BOTH THE LAW AND THE FACTS 
The action to take land from a landowner and substitute money for the same 
should never be taken lightly. 
The Trial Court Judge took this matter very seriously and even took his Bailiff and 
went up to the subject property and studied the problem very carefully26 and then after 
four (4) days of taking evidence27 and after making extensive Findings of Fact28 the Court 
concluded as a matter of law: (Tab I) 
1. That Salt Lake County had not located the subject turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as required by 
78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
2. That Salt Lake County had not located the subject turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good as required 
by 78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
3. That Salt Lake County has acted arbitrarily as contemplated in Salt Lake 
County vs. Rammoselll 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1977). 
4. That the Order of Immediate Occupancy should be denied because there 
is no need for the taking and the taking is not necessary as contemplated in Salt 
Lake County vs. Rammoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1977) and as set out in the Utah 
Code Annotated 78-34-4. 
5. That Salt Lake County had abused its discretion in the proposed taking 
as contemplated in Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975). 
6. That Salt Lake County had not acted reasonably nor in good faith in the 
proposed taking as contemplated in UDOT vs. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, (Utah, 1979) 
also Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975).29 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Counsel submits that it is one thing for the Trial Court to determine that Salt Lake 
County had not located the subject turnaround in a manner which would be most 
78-34-530 of the Utah Code Annotated, thereby substituting the Court's judgment for that 
of the Salt Lake County Council,31 however, it is all together a different thing for the 
Triiil l omrl to .uhsliliiU1 il( (inli'iiiciil lot III,ill nil the < 'omits < ounul on (lit' biiii 111*11 S«ill 
Lake County abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, had not acted reasonably nor in good 
faith.32 
These Conclusions of I aw were not made in a vacuum, they were made b> the 
Court after making many Findings of Fact most of which were based on the testimony 
of Andrea Pullos, Salt Lake County Traffic Engineer,34 who designed the proposed 
Turnaround.35 
Tl le I i ial Coi u I: i i lade i nai ly I ;"ii idii igs of I 'act ' in supporl ol I In11 'OIICIIIM nil" >l 
Law, as noted in Tab I, In the Addendum. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of In re Discipline ofSonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712 
i. .LA J 5: 
"Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code provides as follows: "In civil actions, 
the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith..." Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56(l)(2002). 
Whether a claim is "without merit" is a question of law and we review it for 
correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Whether 
a claim is "not (been) brought or asserted in good faith" is a question of fact and 
we review under a clearly erroneous standard." 
2 
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In the Utah Supreme Court case of Cady vs. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) 
the Court stated beginning on page 151, "While there may be a distinction between bad 
faith and iack of good faith9 in other areas of the law, for purposes of U.C.A., 1953, 
Section 78-27-56, the two terms are synonymous.9' 
Counsel for the Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings of Fact and the 
Conclusions of Law that Salt Lake County abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, had not 
acted reasonably nor in good faith is well founded and clearly established the requisite 
basis for attorney fees pursuant to 78-27-56 Utah Code Annotated. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT INITIALLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES AND THE 
CHANGE OF THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE TAKING DID NOT CHANGE 
THE BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Appellant submits that when it comes to the value of land, the top three criteria are 
location, location and then lastly, location. 
The nature of eminent domain is based upon the notion that the ultimate power 
over property rests with the State and the State is entitled to just take any land they 
determine they want and the land owner is forced to substitute money for the same. 
The right to own property is so fundamental that it is basic to human existence, 
that we are endowed by our creator with certain inalienable rights such as the right to 
own property/8 
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When the State exercises its right of eminent domain it acts on its citizens and 
trumps "God given rights." 
Here Salt Lake County initially sought to "take" 787 square feet of the 
Defendant's land39 where the Defendant already had placed water tanks and a water 
system that would supply water to hundreds of Defendant's residential lots.40 (Tab S) 
When Salt Lake County changed the size and shape of the "taking"41 Salt Lake 
County did nothing to mitigate the damages to the Defendant, as it continued exactly as 
before, to tie up the Defendant's water tanks, water works and hundreds of Defendant's 
residential lots. (Tab X) 
The only difference between the initial take of 0.018 acre42 and the 0.0034:> acre 
was an acknowledgement that the original proposed taking was in bad faith as Salt Lake 
County openly admitted that Salt Lake County only needed a fraction of the 0.018 acre 
for road purposes, but they were taking more than needed so that they could "store 
snow"44 on the balance of the land they were taking. (Note Argument Three and 
Argument Four below regarding the "bad faith" of the same) 
Here Salt Lake County changed their Complaint and the taking of 0.018 acre45 and 
then filed an Amended Complaint seeking to take 0.003 acre abandoning the original 
claim by five-sixths. 
The Utah State Legislature enacted the provisions of 78-34-16 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended in 1967,46 that addressed this exact situation where the 
condemnor abandons its claims after putting the landowner to enormous costs and 
attorneys fees. 
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The Utah Supreme Court first addressed this provision in 1972, in the case of 
Provo City Corporation vs. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629, (Utah, 1972) where the Court 
awarded fees and costs, in a case where the condemnor abandoned its claims. Note also 
Cornish Town vs. Kollen 817 P.2d 305 (Utah. 1991). 
It is clear from the Supreme Court that this statute provides for the recovery of 
"every conceivable expense, damage and costs" including attorneys fees. Note Provo 
City above. 
Defendant has been required to en gage the services of a second law firm of 
Anderson, Call and Wilkinson47 as the County required the same,48 so that they could 
force Counsel herein to take the witness stand and provide testimony for the County.49 
After the Trial Court awarded fees50 but before the Trial Court determined the 
amount51 Salt Lake County moved the Court to set aside the voluntary dismissal filed by 
Salt Lake County52 (Tab G) along with a Motion to Amend the Complaint.53 
Defendant submits that the effort to amend the Complaint54 and proceed with two 
more days of trial on February 16 and 17, 201155 involving the taking of a mere 0.003 
acre was in bad faith for several reasons: 
a. The location of the taking of a mere 0.003 acre could not possibly be more 
injurious to the Defendant56 as it squarely involved the water tanks and the water works 
of the Defendant,57(Tab X) thereby affecting the developability of hundreds of 
Defendant's residential lots. 
b. Salt Lake County did not submit a single exhibit to the Court to support any 
CO 
kind of need for any part of Lot # 1. 
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c. Salt Lake County had not done a single study, report or analysis to support the 
0.003 purportedly needed.59 
d. Salt Lake County did not have a single person from the many departments 
within Public Works60 to testify that after the improvements made following day four of 
trial, Salt Lake County still needed any part of the said 0.003 acre.61 
e. Salt Lake County did not produce a single expert witness that supported the 
claim that Salt Lake County needed to take any part of the 0.003 acre from Defendant.62 
f. Salt Lake County Traffic Engineer, Andrea Pullos did not even go look at the 
property with the associated water tanks, water works, etc., after the Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy was denied and before creating the redesign which was the subject 
of the Amended Complaint.6"* 
g. Salt Lake County Traffic Engineer, Andrea Pullos did not factor in the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law already in place when she created the redesign which 
were the subject of the Amended Complaint.64 (Tab I) 
h. Salt Lake County did not factor the points established on cross examination of 
Andrea Pullos when redesigning the turnaround which was the subject of the Amended 
Complaint.65 
Appellant submits that the list could go on and on about the bad faith involving the 
0.003 acre involved in this matter.66 
Appellant also submits that it is perhaps best stated that Salt Lake County took the 
position that it is the landowners burden of proof to show that Salt Lake County did not 
need the 0.003 acre rather than it being the burden of the Condemnor.67 
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Yet, according to Judge Robert Faust, it was Salt Lake County's own documents, 
which Defendant obtained through discovery, that supported the Defendant's claim that 
Salt Lake County did not need the 0.003 acre at all.68 (Tabs X and Z) 
At page 1360 of the Record is the Ruling by Judge Faust following the sixth day 
of trial. (Tab F) In the ruling the Court refers to Defendant's Exhibit #159 (Tab X) and 
Defendant's Exhibit #169E (Tab Z) as the basis to deny the claims of Salt Lake County 
and to dismiss the action with prejudice. 
The bottom line, as determined by Judge Faust was the Salt Lake County could 
not back up a 43 foot snow plow into a 21 foot space, which was the distance between the 
comer of Lot #1 and the gate, and therefore the claims by Salt Lake County were without 
merit.69 
Additionally, as reflected in the Salt Lake County Fire Code in Defendant's 
Exhibit #4, (Tab K) Salt Lake County would need 60 feet to create a hammerhead 
turnaround for fire trucks. Hence the 21 foot feet from the corner of Lot #1 to Gate was 
not even close to the 60 feet required by the Fire Code. (Tab X) 
Appellant submits here, just as it did before Trial Court,71 that the trial on 
February 16 and 17, 2011 was merely a pretense to get around the provisions of 78-34-16 
of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1967 which provides for attorneys fees and 
costs when the Condemnor abandons the litigation after the landowner expends 
substantial attorneys fees and costs to defend the subject condemnation. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the only difference between the first four days 
of trial, regarding the proposed taking of 0.018 acre and the last two days of trial, 
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regarding the proposed taking of 0.003 acre, was Andrea Pullos, Salt Lake County Traffic 
Engineer merely memorized the words "the least private injury with the greatest public 
good."72 
Defendant claimed the same at the Trial Court level at page 1302 of the record: 
All that the Plaintiff can claim is that Andrea Pullos has worked on saying 
the right words, as found at page 9 of her deposition: 
Q. So when you put the design together in Exhibit 159, tell me what you 
used then, to come up with this configuration, please. 
A. I took the information I had gained from the trial and the suggestion -
and discussion with my attorney about the - hopefully I'll get this right -
the most public good with the least private impact...." 
Hence the only difference between the four days of trial and the upcoming 
trial is Andrea Pullos will be giving a conclusion, "the most public good with the 
least private impact." as each and every FINDING OF FACT will remain 
unchanged/9 (Emphasis original) 
Appellant respectfully submits that there was no need at all for the trial on 
February 16 and 17,2011,73 and therefore this Court should hold Salt Lake County 
accountable under the provisions of 78-34-16 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 
1967 and award the Defendants their Attorneys Fees and Costs in defending the same. 
Salt Lake County acknowledged that there was no need for the continued trial 
after the Motion for Immediate Occupancy was denied.74 
Beginning at page 615 of the Record, Salt Lake County took the following 
position before the Trial Court: 
"Here, the County - like Provo City in the foregoing case - could have simply 
done nothing at all, thereby forcing BC W or the court to formalize the final 
disposition of this action, thereby averting a possible attorneys fee award. 
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However, to do so would only impose on both parties additional delay, time, and 
expense, and would require further unnecessary court intervention." 
After the Court granted the Defendant Attorneys Fees, Salt Lake County did 
exactly what it said it would not do in that it "impose(d) on both parties additional delay, 
time, and expense and (did) require further unnecessary court intervention."75 
By virtue of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court award 
Defendant appropriate attorneys fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
FOR THE CONDUCT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DURING THE LITIGATION 
This claim for Attorneys Fees is based upon the provisions of 78-27-56, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended in 1953, which provides: 
"In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith ..." 
Appellant submits that the language is mandatory as the Trial Court, "shall" award 
fees if the party meets the other criteria. 
As to the provision, "that the action or defense to the action was without merit" is 
well founded in the FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW made and 
entered by the Trial Judge at the close of the evidence, after four days of testimony and 
150 (approximate) exhibits.76 This is the case based as well on the MINUTE ENTRY, at 
the end of the six days of Trial, wherein the Trial Judge ruled:77 
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"After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the hearing, the 
Court finds that the County's amended design of the proposed turnaround is not 
the most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and 
was done without adequately considering the impact on the adjoining lands, use of 
the adjoining lands to effectuate a turnaround, the water system currently in place, 
and the parking situation and its impact on future development." 
Appellant submits that these seven (7) separate grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs 
Complaint, at the close of six days of trial are really no different than the six (6) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW entered by the Court following the first four days of trial, 
wherein the Court concluded as a matter of law that the County's Motion for Immediate 
no 
Occupancy should be denied. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the error by the Trial Court Judge was on the 
issue of "not brought or asserted in good faith." 
Appellant submits that the sixth CONCLUSION OF LAW is dispositive on this 
issue: 
"30. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not acted reasonably 
nor in good faith in the proposed taking as contemplated in UDOT vs. Fuller, 603 
P.2d 814, (Utah, 1979) also Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975)." 
(Tab I) 
The controlling case on the issue of bad faith, is Cady vs. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah, 1983), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated on pages 151 and 152: 
"The statute is narrowly drawn. It was not meant to be applied to all prevailing 
parties in all civil suits. To safeguard against too broad an application, two 
elements are required in addition to being a prevailing party. First, the claim must 
be "without merit." We have not heretofore had occasion to define this term. 
However, under a provision of the Federal Securities Act which awards attorney's 
fees "if the court believes the suit or defense to have been without merit," it was 
stated in Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, (10th Cir.1964), that the term implies 
bordering on frivolity. The dictionary definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight 
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or importance having no basis in law or fact." While there may be some distinction 
between these two terms in other areas of the law, for purposes of this statute we 
believe the terms are synonymous. While this definition may lack some of the 
nuances found in common law definitions, it adequately serves the purpose of the 
statute before us and is clearly understood. See Morton v. Allied Stores Corp., 90 
F.R.D. 352 (D.Colo. 1981). In the instant case, the plaintiffs clearly had no legal 
basis for recovery of additional damages after the Cadys had retained the earnest 
money deposit, Andreasen v. Hansen, supra, and in face of the statute of frauds. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's finding that the claim was "without merit." 
In addition to finding the claim to lack merit, the trial court must also find that 
plaintiffs1 conduct in bringing suit was lacking in good faith. In Tacoma Assoc, of 
Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967), the court 
defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to 
take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the 
fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that one or more of these factors is 
lacking. Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Berber, 4 Wash.App. 341, 481 P.2d 585 
(1971). 
The federal courts offer a similar definition, however, inversely stated. Bad faith 
must be found in order to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party. See Kinnear-
Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.1971); 
Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.1945). Bad 
faith is found when one of the three elements heretofore stated is lacking. While 
there may be a distinction between bad faith and "lack of good faith" in other areas 
of the law, for purposes of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-56, the two terms are 
synonymous." 
Appellant submits that the actions of Salt Lake County herein, were in bad faith 
for the following reasons: 
A. SALT LAKE COUNTY DID NOT HAVE AN HONEST BELIEF IN THE 
PROPRIETY OF THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL. 
a. After the Court ruled following the first four days of trial that the Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy be denied, Salt Lake County could have ended the matter and 
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mitigated the damages and losses of the Defendant. Instead, Salt Lake County proceeded 
to the second round for day five and day six of trial.79 
In day five and day six of trial Salt Lake County did not provide the trial Court 
with a single exhibit in support their claim for any need of any part of Lot 1, Block 9, The 
Groves.80 
In day five and day six of trial Salt Lake County did not produce a single witness, 
expert or otherwise to support the claim that Salt Lake County needed any part of Lot 1, 
Block 9, The Groves Subdivision wherein Salt Lake County was determined to take 
0.003 acre right over Defendant's water tanks and water works. (Tab X) 
In day five and day six of trial Salt Lake County did not provide the Trial Court 
with a single study, analysis or investigation of any kind, in support of any purported 
need to take any part of Lot 1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision. 
After the Court heard and ruled on the Motion for Immediate Occupancy on July 
15, 2008 there was a significant amount of time before the Court proceeded to hear the 
balance of the matter on February 16 and 17, 2011, like over two and one-half years. 
During this two and one-half year period, Salt Lake County significantly modified 
the turnaround area by placing a 60 foot culvert, bringing in fill and blacktopping, etc.83 
During day five and six of trial, Salt Lake County did not produce a single exhibit, 
study, witness or even a shred of evidence that this modified turnaround was not working 
perfectly.84 
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Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief as Salt Lake County did not 
provide the Trial Court with a scintilla of evidence to support any need whatsoever to 
take the 0.003 acre critically located over Defendant's water tanks and water works. 
b. Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief of their activities in reference to 
the water tanks on Lot 1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision. 
On day five of trial, Andrea Pullos, the Salt Lake County Traffic Engineer who 
designed the original proposal as well as the amended proposal testified under direct 
examination by Donald Hansen as follows: 
Q. Did you have any other knowledge with regard to the exact location and 
orientation of those water tanks as they were buried under ground? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge has the county ever been provided by Mr. Walsh, with a 
drawing, a schematic, a map, anything that would indicate the exact size, depth, location 
and orientation of those water tanks, where they lie underground? 
A. Not prior to this design, no.86 
The apparent relevance of this is since Defendant did not provide Salt Lake 
County information regarding the location of the tanks, any injury to Defendant would be 
of their own making. 
Appellant has several problems with this as there are many reasons why this 
evidence is submitted in bad faith: 
1. The lids to the water tanks are above ground and plainly visible to anyone who 
would take the time to just look at them.8 J Appellant submits that this is a classic 
example of what Salt Lake County did in this action, which was, "If I do not go look at 
the proposed turnaround then I can claim that there are all kinds of problems with 
designing a turnaround that would not harm the Defendant."88 
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Even Judge Faust personally observed the lids when he did his sight visit after the 
first day of trial. 
2. As reflected in the transcript of day three of trial, Defendant had in fact taken 
Michael Leon Barrett, Operations Manager for Salt Lake County Public Works, on 
location, opened up the tank and proceeded to assist Salt Lake County in a full and 
complete inspection of the water tanks and water works.89 
Hence the claim that Defendant did not supply information to Salt Lake County 
was wholly untrue and Salt Lake County knew this as Mr. Barrett was not only a Salt 
Lake County employee, he actually testified in the matter on behalf of the Plaintiff 
shortly after Defendant took him to the tanks for Salt Lake County's own inspection.90 
3. Defendant's Exhibits #169G, #169H and #1691, which were admitted into 
evidence without objection shows the pictures taken by Mr. Barrett showing the lids on 
the tanks, ladder, etc., conclusively establishing that Defendant did in fact submit the 
information to Plaintiff as well as the obvious water tanks, visible to anyone who would 
merely take the time to go look.91 
4. Appellant submits that perhaps the most significant bad faith regarding the 
water tanks and water works is found in position taken by Salt Lake County before and 
after the Motion for Immediate Occupancy was denied.92 
Mr. Barrett testified on day three of Trial,93 when Salt Lake County wanted the 
Trial Court to rule that the water tanks are fine and Salt Lake County can design and 
build the road and turnaround right over the top of them without damaging them, etc.: 
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Q. (By Mr. Hansen) In terms of the physical condition of the water tanks, how 
would you describe them? Beyond what you've already said. 
A. Fd say they were in excellent condition. I didn't see any degradation. Just the 
minor cracking in the roof. 
However, when the issue comes up as to compensating the Defendant for the 
tanks, on day five of trial, Salt Lake County puts on Shane Ellis,94 Engineer with Salt 
Lake County Flood Control Department to have him testify about the tanks as follows: 
"That they are in a state of failure and that they can't handle the loads that are 
currently on them with just the soil and water .. ."95 
"So I would say if this was a clean water tank that you were trying to store 
culinary water in, yes, it's past its useful life."96 
Appellant submits that Salt Lake County cannot have an honest belief in the 
propriety of their actions when they put on evidence that the tanks are in "excellent 
condition" when they want the Court to rule that they can just design a road and 
turnaround over the top of them. 
However, after the Court denied the Motion for Immediate Occupancy and the 
Court is then considering compensation to the Defendant, Salt Lake County puts on 
evidence that the tanks are so far gone that they are "past its useful life." 
c. Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief in the propriety of their activities 
in reference to hammerhead turnarounds. 
Andrea Pullos testified that Salt Lake County could not do a hammerhead at 
Roosevelt Trail and Burrs Lane97 because; Salt Lake County had to factor in snow 
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coupled with the fact that Salt Lake County had an official policy not to allow 
hammerheads. 
QO 
Andrea Pullos further testified that it was the national standard as well as the 
AASHTO standard not to allow hammerheads. 
On the second day of trial, Andrea Pullos testified why it was impossible to do a 
hammerhead turnaround at the turnaround site:99 
"... If I used a standard hammerhead, the legs of the hammerhead need to be 60 
feet long and the roadway needs to be 20 feet wide. Roosevelt Trail is only 16 -
1/2 feet and you do not have 60 feet for each leg, you would have to be - cut into 
the mountains in order to get that." (Tab X) 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 4100 is the Salt Lake County Fire Department official 
design pattern for roads and turnarounds (Tab K) and shows the 60 foot leg going each 
direction as described by Andrea Pullos as noted above. 
Appellant submits that the "bad faith" by Salt Lake County occurs after the 
District Court Judge denied the Motion for Immediate Occupancy wherein the County 
sought a circular turnaround and then Salt Lake County sought to do exactly what they 
had already testified was impossible to do and which was against the Salt Lake County 
standard, the national standard and also against the AASHTO standard ie: creates a 
hammerhead design.101 
Defendant's Exhibit 168 shows the actual drawing by Andrea Pullos where she 
testified about how the hammerhead would work for the amended design, which gave rise 
to day five and day six of trial. This Exhibit shows the vehicle proceeding North on 
Burrs Lane, then making a left turn to the West onto Roosevelt Trail and then backing out 
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North towards the gate and then proceeding South down canyon to create the half "H" 
design. 
Defendant's Exhibit 169E shows how this design is a physical impossibility for 
the following three reasons: (Tab Z) 
1. Roosevelt Trail is only 16 - lA feet wide and not the requisite 20 feet wide 
required by the Salt Lake County Fire Code.l(b 
2. Roosevelt Trail is only 47 plus or minus feet long and not the requisite 60 feet 
required by the Salt Lake County Fire Code.104 
3. The distance between the Southeast Corner of Lot #1, Block 9, The Groves 
Subdivision is only 21 feet105 to the gate and not the requisite 60 feet required by the Salt 
Lake County Fire Code. 
These Salt Lake County documents, procured by the Defendant through 
discovery, formed the basis for the Court's ruling ultimately dismissing the 
Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. Note Record at page 1354. (Tab X and Z) 
Hence, it was Salt Lake County's own documents that established the fact that the 
hammerhead turnaround as proposed by Salt Lake County in its amended design, was a 
physical impossibility.106 
Hence, Salt Lake County could not have had an honest belief in the amended 
design as Salt Lake County established in the first four days of trial that it violated Salt 
Lake County policy established by ordinance the national standards and the 
AASHTO standards109 together with the Salt Lake County Fire Code.110 (Tab K) 
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It was as basic as one cannot backup a 43 foot long snow plow111 with only a 21 
foot space. 
It all boils down to, "If one does not go take a look at it then one can make 
outrageous claims." 
Salt Lake County proposed to do in the amended design what they had established 
was impossible, legally112 and physically,1 l j when testifying about the original design. 
Andrea Pullos did not go look at the subject turnaround even after she was on the 
stand during the first four days of trial establishing the defects in the County's original 
design.114 
A great majority of the FINDINGS OF FACT, following the first four days of trial 
on the Motion for Immediate Occupancy, supporting the Conclusion that Salt Lake 
County has not acted reasonably nor in good faith, have Andrea Pullos name in same.115 
There was just over two and a half years for her to merely go look, but Salt Lake 
County was determined to take the 0.003 acres over the Defendant's water tanks and 
water works so there would be no need to go look.U6 
This is born out in the record at page 1302, where she testified that she and her 
attorney merely worked on her saying the right words: 
Q. So when you put the design together in Exhibit 159, tell me what you used, 
then, to come up with this configuration, please. 
A. I took the information I had gained from the trial and the suggestion - and 
discussion with my attorney about the - hopefully I'll get this right - the most 
public good with the least private impact. ..." 
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Appellant submits that this matter is pretty simple, the total basis for the fifth and 
sixth days of trial, was not producing exhibits, not producing studies, not producing 
expert witness, etc., or even going and looking at the area, the total basis was Andrea 
Pullos memorizing the words, " most public good with the least private impact." 
Salt Lake County did not have an honest belief in the propriety of the 0.003 acre 
taking over the water tanks and water works of Defendant. 
B. SALT LAKE COUNTY FULLY INTENDED TO TAKE 
UNCONSCIONABLE ADVANTAGE OF DEFENDANT. 
1. Salt Lake County made this matter as cheap as possible for Salt Lake County 
and as expensive as it could for the Defendant. 
When Salt Lake County deposited with the Court the alleged "fair market value" 
as a condition precedent to the subject taking they only deposited $600.00,117 even 
though they acknowledged in the original Complaint that they had not covered the 
impacts on the water tanks, etc.118 
In contrast Judge Faust established the damages to be $130,000.00 as reflected in 
the record at page 1354. (Tab F) 
Salt Lake County did not engage a single expert witness, who was not already on 
the County payroll, and therefore did not have to pay a single expert witness fee.119 
Salt Lake County did not produce a single Expert Witness Report, as it claimed 
that it did not need to, because its witnesses were all employees of Salt Lake County.120 
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Salt Lake County refused to cooperate in supplying the Court with the transcripts 
of the first four days of trial and therefore the Defendant was required to spend tons of 
money on the transcripts.121 
In reference to Jerry Webber, MAI, Defendant had engaged him to testify and paid 
him thousands of dollars for preparation as an Expert Witness.122 Shortly before trial on 
day five and day six Defendant learned that Jerry Webber's analysis was flawed due to 
using comparables that did not exist at the time of the taking and only came into 
existence after the subject taking123 and also flawed because he did not factor how the 
footings on the single family dwelling were impacted by the taking.124 
By virtue of these critical flaws, Defendant did not call him to testify. 
Salt Lake County then subpoenaed Jerry Webber to testify for Salt Lake County 
19^ paying him only his witness fee, leaving the Defendant paying him thousands of 
dollars for preparation and Salt Lake County only paying a witness fee, yet reaping the 
benefit of the thousands paid him by Defendant. 
Furthermore, Jerry Webber was the only Expert Witness on value called by 
Plaintiff, as they did not engage any other Expert Witness on the same.127 
In the end, Jerry Webber ultimately changed his position in support of 
Defendant128 however, Salt Lake County reaped thousands of dollars of benefit, with the 
Defendant left holding the bag. 
Salt Lake County forced the Defendant to engage an additional law firm and then 
after the Defendant engaged the second law firm at tremendous expense, Salt Lake 
County abandoned its claims.129 
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This maneuver by Salt Lake County cost the Defendant dearly. 
Salt Lake County cost the Defendant tremendous expense by attempting to shift 
the burden of establishing the burden to the Defendant to show a lack of need for the 
taking rather than Salt Lake County establishing itself the need for the taking. 
Note as just one example the discovery request by Salt Lake County at page 960 
of the Record: 
"1. With respect to each of your affirmative defenses (see Answer to Plaintiffs 
First Amended Complaint for Condemnation, January 8, 2010, Defenses One 
through Twenty Two (pp.2-4)), please set forth a separate detailed statement 
setting forth every factual and legal basis for each such affirmative defense 
including but not limited to (a) every witness who has knowledge of the alleged 
facts, along with each such witness' full name, current home address, current 
business address, current home telephone, and current business telephone, and (b) 
every document which relates in any way to such facts and the source of each such 
document, including the current name, address and telephone numbers of every 
person(s) who created, authored, edited, and./(sic) or possesses such documents." 
Defendant had to file for a Protective Order for this and other discovery abuses by 
Salt Lake County which cost the Defendant significantly.130 
In sharp contract Salt Lake County refused to answer discovery requests from the 
Defendant on the basis that Salt Lake County had counted the Interrogatories with it 
subparts and decided they totaled more than 25. 
This forced the Defendant to take the deposition of Andrea Pullos a second time at 
great expense to the Defendant.132 
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the basis that the 
only difference between the first four days of trial where the Court denied the Motion for 
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Immediate Occupancy and the upcoming trial was Andrea Pullos admitted that she now 
had memorized the words, "the most public good with the least private impact."134 
The Court may well have saved the Defendant significant expense had the Plaintiff 
filed a good faith response to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as the facts as 
established at the time of trial in day five and day six of trial, were the same facts 
I O C 
supporting the Defendant's Motion. 
In the case of Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah, 1998), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the intent to harass and to increase litigation costs was sufficient 
bad faith to justify an award of attorneys fees. 
C. SALT LAKE COUNTY CLEARLY INTENTED TO AND HAD 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT THAT ITS ACTIONS WOULD HINDER, DELAY 
AND DEFRAUD THE DEFENDANT. 
Appellant submits that it is most telling that Salt Lake County was going after a 
teeny tiny 0.003 acre right over the water tanks and water works of the Defendant. (Tab 
X) 
The water tanks and water works were the life's blood for the development of the 
400 plus lots of the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff tied up the Defendant's project for almost a full four years and has 
permanently damaged the Defendant as noted below. 
Appellant submits that it was the testimony of Andrea Pullos that established that 
facts as stated in the FINDINGS OF FACT as most of them have her name in them.136 
(Tab I) 
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It was the testimony of Andrea Pullos that established the CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, that Salt Lake County had acted in bad faith.137 
Lastly, it was the Salt Lake County's own documents that established the final 
basis for the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice.138 (Tab X and Z) 
Hence, it was Salt Lake County's witnesses and documents that formed the basis 
for the Trial Court to dismiss with prejudice.139 
Hence, the landowner had to go to tremendous expense to put on a mountain of 
evidence for the Trial Court to substitute is judgment for that of the Salt Lake County 
Council on the basis of bad faith. 
Now the landowner is left holding the bag with horrific expenses and attorneys 
fees and the wrongdoer has absolutely no consequence. 
Furthermore the landowner has suffered "astronomical" losses due to Salt Lake 
County tying up the project until the real estate market collapsed.140 
Salt Lake County made outrageous claims regarding the need for retaining walls141 
and left the burden on the landowner to disprove.142 Salt Lake County made the claims 
without a single study, expert witness or investigation of any kind. Pullos did not even 
go look at it one time for the purpose of the original design143 nor one time for the 
amended design,144 yet continued to the very end with the claim that there had to be mega 
retaining walls in order to shift the turnaround off of the Defendant's property.145 (Tab Y) 
Perhaps the greatest element that defeated these ridiculous claims was the quality 
of an outstanding Judge who took the time to go look at the problem in the face where 
Salt Lake County had not. 
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The retaining walls scam was a theory throughout the Plaintiffs case. Plaintiff 
knew of the same as Andrea Pullos provided the testimony to support the facts that there 
was more than ample ground on the East side of the turnaround to shift the same 
completely off of the Defendant's property. 
Finding of Fact #8 established that there was eight to ten feet of blacktop that was 
not used and Finding of Fact #9 established an additional ten feet, all to the East, thereby 
totally avoiding taking any of the Defendant's property altogether. (Tab F) 
These FINDINGS were not made in a vacuum, as Andrea Pullos clearly 
established that there were sufficient flat area for the 75 foot turnaround without doing 
any excavation. At page 63 and 64 on the third day of trial, she testified on Cross 
Examination: 
Q. Okay. And can you tell the Court what the distance is then, between 
those two points? 
A. Approximately 80 feet. 
Q. And you told the Court you needed 75 feet, did you not, earlier today? 
A. Yes 
Q. And so it sits today, you wouldn't have to do any excavation as far as 
cuts go to put the turnaround then to the east; is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because you have a driveway in the middle of that area that would 
impact and - that there would be impacts on that would change how it, it is 
designed. 
THE COURT: As I'm understanding it for the cul-de-sac section itself 
would remain flat, but it's the takeoff there from that's the problem. And frankly, 
as I mentioned last time to both counsel, I still didn't quite fully grasp why your 
were thinking there needed to be this retaining wall on the side of the driveway. 
Appellant submits that Judge Faust could readily see the unmeritorious claim 
regarding the retaining walls. (Tab W) 
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Andrea Pullos testified that these imaginary retaining walls would need to be thirty 
(30) feet high,146 footings a third of the height of the walls,147 there would need to be 
three of them,148 and the costs would be between five hundred thousand dollars 
($500,000.00) and one million dollars ($1,000,000.00).149 
Appellant submits that a review of the transcript for these three or four pages, 
highlights what not looking at the turnaround meant in this action as this testimony by 
Andrea Pullos is totally made up out of the sky.150 (Tab W) 
Appellant submits that this is just another glaring example how Salt Lake County 
would make up outrageous claims, without having even looked at the area and then shift 
the burden to prove otherwise to the Defendant. 
Notwithstanding the unmeritorious claim for mega retaining walls, the Honorable 
Robert Faust made very specific FINDINGS OF FACTS No. 8 and No. 9 quoted above 
that there was plenty of room to shift the turnaround to the East when he denied the 
Motion for Immediate Occupancy. (Tab I) 
Appellant submits that the ability of Salt Lake County to shift the turnaround to 
the East to avoid taking any part of Lot #1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision, was so 
obvious that even the Deputy County Attorney, Donald Hansen stipulated to it: 151 
Q. (BY MR. WALSH) Okay. Let's go in this direction here. And tell me how 
far. 
A. Fm still a little bit confused on your questioning here, because that's just 
basically till you hit the toe of slope you're less than 1 5 -
THE COURT: Maybe I can -
THE WITNESS: -percent. 
THE COURT: Maybe I can speed it up. I think what Mr. Walsh is trying to 
prove, there's nothing that prohibits you from designing and putting the thing over 
on that side, all the way over. 
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Is that right, Mr. Walsh? 
MR. WALSH: That's right. 
THE COURT: That's the bottom line? 
MR. HANSEN: We'll stipulate to that then, Your Honor. 
Notwithstanding all the above, Andrea Pullos maintained through the end of the 
Plaintiffs case that the imaginary retaining walls would be required to move the 
turnaround to the East,152 even in the face of the law of the case in the FINDINGS OF 
FACT #8 AND #9, which she established herself at the hearing on the Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy. (Tab I) 
The Defendant then produced a mountain of evidence showing the Trial Court that 
the claim regarding retaining walls was disingenuous. 
Note for example Defendant's Ex. #175 which includes motion pictures, which 
shows how the Salt Lake County Fire Truck, as well as many other vehicles, could 
turnaround perfectly after the modifications were made following the first four days of 
trial and before the amended design was created. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this conclusively established no need 
whatsoever to take any part of Lot #1, Block 9, The Grove Subdivision. 
By virtue of the foregoing, Appellant submits that Salt Lake County clearly 
intended to and had knowledge of the fact that its actions would hinder, delay and 
defraud the Defendant. 
ARGUMENTS FOUR 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
FOR THE CONDUCT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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OUTSIDE OF THE LITIGATION 
The East side of the turnaround even beyond the platted road known as Burrs Lane 
belonged to Salt Lake County by prescription.153 
This area included all of the property that Defendant proposed Salt Lake County 
use in order to not damage Lot #1 and the accompanying water tanks and water 
works.154(TabY) 
Salt Lake County "as the manager or trustee of public roads" had engaged in a 
lawsuit before Judge Homer Wilkinson to establish this area as belonging to the public.155 
Defendant's Exhibit #9 is the Order, Judgment and Decree entered and executed 
by the Honorable Homer Wilkinson which refers to this area as the "traveled road" which 
states in paragraph #5: 
"The Court concludes as a matter of law that the traveled road leading up to 
Roosevelt Trail is a public road, by operation of 27-12-89 Utah Code Annotated, 
coupled with the fact that Salt Lake County has maintained the same." 
This is also confirmed in Defendant's Exhibit #12 at paragraph #14, as well as 
Defendant's Exhibit #14, at paragraph #6, which states: 
"6. That title to this use and traveled road (Burrs Lane) located below Roosevelt 
Trail is quieted in the public and is a public road." 
This prescriptive road was far wider than the beaten path, as it was as wide as was 
reasonable and necessary, based upon its historical use as a road.156 
By virtue of this Court Order by Judge Wilkinson, Salt Lake County owned all of 
the flat land to the East where the Defendant proposed the turnaround be shifted so as to 
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not damage Defendant's Lot #1 and its accompanying water tanks and water works. (Tab 
W) 
As perhaps the ultimate act of bad faith, Salt Lake County, right in the middle of 
this litigation abandoned this property,157 gave it back to the adjacent property owners, 
for free158 and then argued before the Trial Court repeatedly that they could not move the 
proposed turnaround to the East, because Salt Lake County did not own the same.159 
Appellant submits that this action by Salt Lake County violated every factor of 
bad faith outlined in Cady above. 
Defendant admitted into evidence Ex. 127, showing the Court an alternative to the 
proposed taking of any part of Lot #1, Block 9, The Groves. (Tab Y) 
This proposal to Salt Lake County showed the Trial Court where Salt Lake County 
had referenced this general area as "flat parking area."160 
This proposal showed the Trial Court where the turnaround could be placed on flat 
area, with no retaining walls on the property that already belonged to Salt Lake County 
and utilized the flat area referred to in FINDINGS OF FACT #8 AND #9 with eight to 
ten feet of blacktop plus another ten feet from blacktop to foliage. (Tab W and Tab Y) 
Appellant submits that every square inch needed to move the proposed turnaround 
to the East so as to avoid taking any part of Lot #1, Salt Lake County gifted to the 
neighboring landowners, and thereafter consistently repeated the notion that Salt Lake 
County has to take part of Lot #1 as there is no property to the East to avoid taking the 
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Appellant submits that what compounds the bad faith is the fact that Andrea 
Pullos, while making no time to look at the turnaround for purposes the original design162 
and making no time to look at the turnaround for purposes of the amended design,163 not 
only went to look at the property Salt Lake County intended to abandon, but she 
described her actions as follows: "In order to give a fair recommendation, I went up and 
walked the roadway with Larry Helquist.. ."164 
Appellant submits that in the mockery of "In order to give a fair 
recommendation.." Andrea Pullos did go look at the turnaround when it was time for her 
to rationalize her original design for her first deposition,165 again for her second 
deposition regarding the amended design166 and also again for purposes of trial.167 
In sharp contrast, "in order to make a fair recommendation" Tosh Kano went and 
viewed the area two times,168 Matthew Roblez went and viewed inside the tanks two 
times,169 Blake Karrington viewed the area hundreds and hundreds of times,170 even 
Judge Robert Faust went and viewed the area.171 
In fact, the Court Bailiff, put in more time and attention than Andrea Pullos as he 
accompanied Judge Faust for the onsite examination. 
Appellant submits that in another action, outside of the trial itself, Salt Lake 
County violated every factor of bad faith outlined in Cady above. 
This action, by Salt Lake County was a pretense for the taking itself as Linda 
Hamilton, Director of Public Works, took the County Council to the turnaround site in 
order to show them how badly Salt Lake County needed an enlarged turnaround.173 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This was done so that she could show the Court an alleged good faith taking, as 
she went to great efforts in the trial itself to tell the Court about her efforts.174 
At page 36 and 37 of the transcript for May 8, 2008, she stated as follows: 
"We took a snow plow up and we took a sanitation truck up and we - and I 
had other people with me, I had the mayor up there at one point, I've had County 
council members there, I've had the administrative assistants to council members 
there and we would just show them what it was like to try and turn one of those 
vehicles around in that turn-around. And these were all when there was no snow 
on the ground." 
This bad faith by Salt Lake County however, backfired because Linda Hamilton 
had to admit on Cross Examination that she ran the tests when there were temporary 
barricades put up by Thomas Johnson. 
On page 56 and 57 of the transcript for May 8, 2008, on cross examination she 
testified: 
Q. So, the County has never done a test, any kind of demonstration with being able 
to turn round in this turnaround where that obstruction wasn't there; fair? 
A. I haven't done a test, no. 
These posts put in by Thomas Johnson,175 were the subject of another bad faith 
action by Salt Lake County.176 
Long after the ruling by Judge Wilkinson establishing the turnaround on the East 
side as a public land, Thomas Johnson placed temporary red posts where he claimed the 
property was his and not public.177 
Thomas Johnson knew this was not honest as he had participated in the 
Wilkinson litigation to have this very land declared as belonging to Salt Lake County.178 
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Don Hansen then wrote a letter demanding that these posts be removed as 
reflected in Defendant's Exhibit No. 7: 
"This office represents the interests of Salt Lake County ("County") in and to the 
paved, County-maintained area at the intersection of Burrs Lane and Roosevelt 
Trail (locally known and hereinafter referred to as the "turnaround") in the 
Pinecrest District of Emigration Canyon. It is the County's understanding and 
position that the Utah Third District Court quieted title to the entire paved portion 
of the turnaround, and the entire platted, as well as the used and traveled, portions 
of Burrs Lane below Roosevelt Trail, in the County as a public road in 1992. The 
County has maintained that position continuously since that time. 
This office was recently informed that within the past two to three weeks, you 
erected or caused to be erected, a steel chain-link fence across a portion of heaved 
turnaround, and in so doing, you caused damage to the asphalt pavement by 
digging eleven holes for placement of steel fenceposts. It is our further 
understanding that the fence was in place for less than one week, has been 
removed, and that the holes dug in the asphalt have been temporarily filled with 
concrete. The Court regards such actions as tress and destruction of County 
property. Accordingly, you are hereby instructed to immediately cease and desist 
the placement of any fence or other encroachment upon the County's property at 
the turnaround. In the event of any future placement by you, or at your behest, of 
fences or other objects constituting a trespass upon a County road dedicated to 
public use will result in both removal of such objects(s) by the Court and legal 
action against you...." 
The bad faith comes into play when Salt Lake County abandons its claims that 
Judge Wilkinson established this area as belonging to Salt Lake County, in order to 
justify taking the Defendant's property on Lot #1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision. 
It is just another action of bad faith by Salt Lake County, as shown in Defendant's 
Exhibit 35, Salt Lake County Commissioner Brent Overson suggested to Thomas 
Johnson to in fact put up the said fence. 
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These posts were the subject of two separate lawsuits filed in the Third District 
Court,179 each assigned to Judge Quinn wherein the Defendant attempted to get the Court 
to establish the subject land as belonging to Salt Lake County. 
Appellant has never been able to understand why Salt Lake County as "manager 
or trustee of public roads"180 would oppose a lawsuit establishing the subject land as 
belonging to Salt Lake County, other than pure bad faith. 
Appellant submits that there are two obvious examples of the bad faith of Salt 
Lake County reflected in the different positions taken by Salt Lake County in the first 
four days of trial and the last two days of trial. 
(1) In the last two days of trial Salt Lake County made no attempt to take all of 
the Defendant's property to toe of slope. Salt Lake County acknowledged there was no 
need.181 
(2) In the last two days of trial Salt Lake County made no attempt to suggest that 
Salt Lake County needed Defendant's property for snow storage. This Finding of Fact 
established the bad faith claim and so Salt Lake County conceded there was no need.183 
The biggest difference between the first four days of trial and the last two was 
Andrea Pullos finally getting the words down, "the least private injury with the greatest 
public good." 
Andrea Pullos admitted the same when she testified that no one had complained or 
made any kind of claim that the modified turnaround built by Salt Lake County between 
day four and day five of trial, some two and half years, was not working perfectly.184 
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Pullos outright admitted that she talked with her attorney, Donald Hansen and that 
formed the basis for the new design: 
A. I took the information I had gained from the trial and the suggestion - and 
discussion with my attorney about the - hopefully I'll get this right - the most 
public good with the least private impact. ..." 
Appellant submits that Andrea Pullos openly admits that the new design was not 
based on new evidence or new studies, etc. 
Appellant therefore submits that it should have its Attorneys Fees and Costs 
compensated as there is no dispute that Salt Lake County attempted to take the only lot of 
BCW that had year round access, electricity, gas, telephone, water, sanitation, fire 
protection and a culvert where the stream is protected and therefore the Defendant has 
unique development opportunities as the same would have less affect on the stream.185 
Additionally it is undisputed that Salt Lake County attempted to take a mere 0.003 
acre which tied up the water tanks and the water works for all of the other 400 plus 
residential lots of Defendant for almost four years and thereby permanently damaged the 
Defendant. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
AS SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS A HISTORY OF ABUSE IN REFERENCE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
On the third day of trial, Lonnie Johnson, Administrative Assistant to Councilman 
at Large, Randy Horiuchi, testified that he had attended various meetings involving 
condemnation actions against the Defendant.186 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In reference to the condemnation actions involving the Defendant's property 
Lonnie Johnson testified how Salt Lake County had taken actions without 
communicating at all with Defendant and this occurred as many as six times.187 
He testified how Salt Lake County would not even notify the Defendant of the 
hearings involving the Defendant's own property and this occurred as many as five 
times.188 
He testified how Salt Lake County had meetings where Defendant was not 
allowed to speak and this happened as many as four times.189 
At page 236 Lonnie Johnson testified on Examination by Mr. Hansen as follows: 
Q. You also stead - stated in your deposition testimony that you believed that the 
condemnation action was unfair because it was part of harassment against Walsh 
by the County over 12 to 15 years. 
A. Actually over, over a longer period than that. 
Appellant submits that this uncontroverted testimony is most significant as this 
witness was identified by Salt Lake County as one of their witnesses for their case in 
chief.190 
This is an insider commenting on actions taken by Salt Lake County not only 
about this bad faith action but the bad faith of Salt Lake County for longer than fifteen 
years. 
Lonnie Johnson is part of the Administration of Salt Lake County as he is the 
Administrative Assistant to Councilman Randy Horiuchi.191 
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This testimony was consistent with several of Defendant's Exhibits that were 
admitted into evidence that showed the bad faith eminent domain actions of Salt Lake 
County. 
Note Defendant's Ex. #17, wherein Salt Lake County, while using its eminent 
domain power attempted to create a parking lot for twelve parking spaces, on the exact 
same lot they were trying to condemn in the action herein. Note that Salt Lake County 
intended to culvert the stream right in front of the Defendant's residence. (Tab M) 
Note Defendant's Ex. #19, wherein Salt Lake County, while using its eminent 
domain power attempted to condemn Lots #25, #26, #27 and #28, in Block 8, The Groves 
Subdivision immediately north of Defendant's residence. (Tab N) 
Note Defendant's Ex. #24, wherein Salt Lake County, again attempted to create a 
parking lot right in front of the Defendant's residence. (Tab O) 
Defendant was spared from these abusive actions by Divine Intervention as both 
the State and Federal Government would not allow the stream to be culverted as reflected 
in Defendant's Ex. #18 and #23. 
Perhaps the greatest abuse by Salt Lake County, which is inverse condemnation at 
its extreme, is reflected in Defendant's Ex. #32, wherein Salt Lake County passed a 
formal Resolution No. 2113, prohibiting the County Road from being more than 13 
(thirteen) feet wide, plus one foot shoulders on each side for a total width of 15 feet wide, 
leading up to the Defendant's 480 lots. (Tab P) 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The whole resolution bears repeating all of its terms here, but in the interests of 
space Appellant submits that it is surreal as it makes it a crime to make this road wide 
enough for a fire truck, etc. 
Lonnie Johnson testified that he was the Public Works Director at the time and he 
and Fire Chief Berry were instructed by the Salt Lake County Commission, under the 
Direction of Commissioner Jim Bradley, not to comment at the Public Hearing regarding 
this flagrant violation of the Defendant's rights. 
Appellant submits that these many actions by Salt Lake County and the specific 
intent in the subject lawsuit as testified to by Lonnie Johnson clearly show why Judge 
Robert Faust made a Conclusion of Law that Salt Lake County had not acted in good 
faith. 
Appellant submits that none of the foregoing evidence, in Argument Five was 
challenged at trial in any way by Salt Lake County as the County Attorney could not as it 
is too surreal.193 
Appellant submits that the testimony of Lonnie Johnson, which was undisputed, 
clearly establishes the subjective intent of Salt Lake County to harm the Defendant as 
there can be no question about the actions of Salt Lake County, in reference to: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to 
take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the 
fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or defraud others. 
Salt Lake County acted with pinpoint accuracy when going after a mere 0.003 acre 
which tied up the Defendant's water tanks, water works and hundreds of Defendant's 
residential lots for almost four years and thereby permanently harmED the Defendant. 
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ARGUMENT SIX 
THE ACTIONS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY VIOLATED 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Appellant is not seeking any kind of reward or any kind of windfall by virtue of 
the actions of Salt Lake County. 
Appellant is merely seeking to be made whole for the Attorneys Fees and Costs it 
had to expend to defend against the actions of Salt Lake County. Appellant is merely 
seeking to be put back where it was before Salt Lake County brought its unmeritorious 
action. 
Appellant, Butler Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation did nothing 
wrong, that brought about this action. 
This is not a case where BCW had committed a crime of any kind for which the 
law requires the Defendant to answer. 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nor is this a case where the Defendant breached some standard of care which 
proximately caused injury to another. 
All that can be said of the Defendant's actions is that it held title to the property 
which Salt Lake County set out to take. 
Hence, Defendant is charged with "merely holding title to land." 
The act of owning land and owning title is a fundamental God given right and one 
secured by the United States Constitution.194 
Here Salt Lake County took control of the land and the water tanks and the water 
works and tied the Defendant's hands from developing its 480 residential lots for almost 
four (4) years. 
The critical four years when real estate was booming and where the Defendant 
could have developed, marketed and sold potentially hundreds of its residential lots, had 
its water tanks and water works not been the subject of condemnation action. 
Judge Faust recognized the great damages the Defendant was sustaining when he 
described the same as "astronomical" in FINDING OF FACT NO. 19: 
"19. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public 
good, as Andrea Pullos testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself 
and she had not considered the potential costs in relocating the water tanks, other 
land that would be needed to relocate the tanks, and whether the whole water 
system would be affected and how the loss of water system could affect the 
development of unnumbered lots and hence the expense of putting the turnaround 
over the water tanks could be astronomical." 
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Appellant submits that the loss is not measured by what the property was actually 
being put to at the time of the taking rather Appellant submits that the loss is measured by 
the highest and best use to which Defendant could put its property. 
In the age old case of Movie vs. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882 (Utah 1947) the 
Utah Supreme Court with facts strikingly similar to this case, stated this principle 
perfectly: 
"It is elemental in eminent domain cases, that the owner is entitled to the value of 
the property for the highest and best use to which it could be put at the time of the taking, 
and is not limited to the use then actually made of it." 
Here Salt Lake County took away the "use" when the "highest and best use" was 
"astronomically" more valuable than when it was returned to the Defendant. 
The actions of Salt Lake County were intentional and in bad faith. 
The resolution passed by Salt Lake County as conclusively established in 
Defendant's Ex. 32, to limit the road to a mere 13 feet coupled with making it a crime to 
make it wide enough to comply with Salt Lake County's own fire code is rank bad faith. 
This put all 480 residential lots of the Defendant is a catch 22 when it came to 
developing and getting building permits. 
This drastically reduced the value of all 480 residential lots as access is critical to 
any potential purchaser and no bank will finance a residential lot that does not have 
meaningful access, with no fire protection, etc. 
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The original effort to take all of the Defendant's flat area in Lot #1, Block 9, The 
Groves Subdivision is rank bad faith. This is confirmed in the amended design as Salt 
Lake County thereby admitted that it did not "need all the flat area" in the first place.195 
Taking all of the flat area prohibited the Defendant from putting a home on Lot #1 
and Lot #2 out right.196 
This one lot not only had the water tanks and water works already in place it was 
the only lot of all 480 that had "electrical, gas, telephone and water already in place for 
development, etc."197 
The pinpoint attempted taking of 0.003 acre was no accident as Salt Lake County 
acknowledged the existence of the water tanks and the water works from the beginning in 
the Complaint for Condemnation. 
Here Salt Lake County acknowledged that no studies, no investigations, not 
witness, etc., that suggested that Salt Lake County needed any part of Lot #1, Block 9, 
The Groves. Appellant is merely requesting to be made whole by way of "just 
compensation" for the attorneys fees and costs it had to expend to defend the 
unmeritorious and bad faith action of Salt Lake County. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE ACTIONS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY VIOLATED 
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Section 22 of the Utah State Constitution provides: 
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"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." 
Here the claim is much different than is the claim under the United States 
Constitution as the Utah State Constitution prohibits the mere damaging of private 
property without just compensation. 
Here the loss sustained by the Defendant is based on "damaged goods" as the 480 
residential lots were "astronomically damaged" in the before and after state. 
In reality Salt Lake County continues to damage the Defendant's property as the 
Resolution to limit the access to Defendant's property is still restricted to a 13 foot wide 
road and it is still a crime to attempt to widen it. (Tab P also Tab T, U and V - too narrow 
for plows) 
Additionally, no purchaser could ever qualify with a lending institution once the 
lack of ingress and egress was discovered 
In the case of Movie vs. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882 (Utah 1947) which is very 
similar to this matter, the Utah Supreme Court referred to a measure of damages as 
follows: 
"That the reasonable rental value of property, the possession, use and control of 
which has been withheld from the owner or lawful possessor is a proper measure 
of damage for such withholding, in the absence of claims of special damage, is too 
elemental to require citation of authority." 
Here there are special damages in the costs and attorneys fee incurred by the 
Appellant. 
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Appellant submits that Salt Lake County has taken the heart of Defendant's 
project and has prevented the Defendant from doing any kind of development with the 
same for almost four full years. 
It is the four years in history when the real estate market was at an all time high 
and fell to an all time low. 
Appellant submits that this constitutes a classic taking that is prohibited by both 
the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the taking issue in reference to a regulatory 
taking in the case Amell vs. Salt Lake County, 112 P.3d 1214 (Utah App. 2005) 
beginning at page 1220: 
Tf 16 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 
581,41 L.Ed. 979 (1897), states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. "The clearest sort of taking 
occurs when the government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own 
proposed use." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 
L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). "[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized two other 
categories of takings: regulatory takings and development exactions." Diamond B-Y 
Ranches, 2004 UT App 135 at f 14, 91 P.3d 841. This case involves a regulatory 
taking. 
% 17 The United States Supreme Court first recognized regulatory takings in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). 
In Justice Holmes's now famous words, "while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415, 
43 S.Ct. 158. A regulation that" 'denies all economically beneficial or productive 
use of land* will require compensation under the Takings Clause." Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)). This is a so-called total 
taking. Even if a regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use 
of land, an analysis of a complex of factors indicates whether the interference is so 
great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred. See id. The factors include tf[t]he 
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economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations 
... [and] the character of the governmental action." Penn Cent, Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). "These 
inquires are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the 
government from 'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 
at 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 
S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (I960)). 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court "prevent the government from 
'forcing some people alone (Defendant) to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" "particularly, in light to which the 
regulation has interfered with the distinct investment-backed expectations ... coupled 
with the character of the governmental action. 
Appellant submits that the preventing of meaningful access coupled with tying up 
the water tanks, water works and hundreds of Defendant's lots has permanently damaged 
the Defendant and the overwhelming expense in attorneys fees and costs all in violation 
of the Defendant's Utah State Constitutional right prohibiting the same. 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellant claims that it should have been awarded Attorneys Fees at the Trial 
Court level and consistent with Softsolutions, Inc. vs. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 
1095 (Utah, 2000) should be awarded Attorneys Fees on Appeal. 
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In the case of Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah, 1998), at page 319, the 
Utah Supreme spelled out when Attorneys Fees are recoverable on appeal: 
As a final matter, we address the Fitzgerald parties' claim that they are entitled to 
the attorney fees they incurred on appeal. We stated in Salmon v. Davis County, 
916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996), "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes 
broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes 
them." In addition, when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, "the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah 
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Appellant submits that when the dust has all settled, Salt Lake County is not out a 
10R 
dime as they have not lost a thing. They undeniably have tied up the Defendant's 
property and the Defendant has had to gather a mountain of evidence to beat the 
presumption that Governmental entities have in the exercise of their powers of eminent 
domain. 
As noted above, it is very rare that the Trial Court Judge will substitute his 
judgment for that of the Salt Lake County Council.199 
Yet here the Court has held that Salt Lake County cannot use their power of 
eminent domain and the Trial Judge listed seven reasons why and all of these are 
independent of the Findings and Conclusions, as the final ruling is based upon the 
amended design. 
In reality they did not have to pay for any expert witness.200 They paid Jerry 
Webber at witness fee after the Defendant paid him thousands of dollars.201 
The other experts used by the Salt Lake County were mere employees who were 
engaged to discredit the Defendant's witnesses.202 So Salt Lake County essentially had 
no costs and the Defendant had over $ 13,000.00 in costs. 
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Salt Lake County put on no witness in support of need, no study in support of need 
and frankly not even a scintilla of evidence in support of any purported need. 
Hence, this whole trial was needless. 
By virtue of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that it be awarded all of 
its costs and attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to the Utah State Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that it is most significant that it was Andrea Pullos herself, the 
Traffic Engineer from Salt Lake County, who provided the Court with the evidence that 
defeated the Motion for Immediate Occupancy. (Tab I) 
Similarly, it was Andrea Pullos' notes, obtained by the Defendant through 
discovery that provided the Court with the evidence that caused the Court to dismiss Salt 
Lake County's Complaint with prejudice. (Tab X and Tab Z) 
It has been Lonnie Johnson, Administrative Assistant to Randy Horiuchi, Salt 
Lake County Councilman at Large, who supplied the Court with the evidence that this 
action was asserted subjectively in bad faith. 
It was Toshiharu Kano, prior Salt Lake County Division Director in charge of 
Public Works Operations for Salt Lake County who testified that the proposed amended 
design was far more dangerous than the turnaround that already existed on the ground 
when he went and observed the sight distance problems.204 
It was the Salt Lake County Fire Department that showed the Court in the Blake 
Karrington's pictures that the Fire Department could turnaround just fine with the as built 
prior to day five and day six of trial.205 
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Appellant submits that it was Salt Lake County employees, past and present that 
has established that this action was without merit and brought and maintained in bad 
Appellant submits that it was Salt Lake County documents, extracted from Salt 
Lake County through discovery that established that this action was without merit and 
brought and maintained in bad faith.207 
At the end of the first four days of trial, the Honorable Robert Faust, wrote in his 
Minute Entry at page 480B of the Record: 
"After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the hearing, the 
Court finds that the County designed the proposed turnaround without adequately 
considering the impact on the adjoining land, the water systems currently in place, 
the burden of additional snow storage on the Defendant's property, and the 
parking situation and its resulting impact on further development." 
At the end of the fifth and sixth days of trial, the Honorable Robert Faust, wrote in 
his Minute Entry at page 1360 of the Record: (Note Salt Lake County withdrew its claim 
of need for snow storage.) 
"After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the hearing, the 
Court finds that the County's amended design of the proposed turnaround is not 
the most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury and 
was done without adequately considering the impact on the adjoining lands, use of 
adjoining lands to effectuate a turnaround, the water system currently in place, and 
the parking situation and its impact on future development." 
Appellant submits that there should be no wonder why the Trial Court ruled the 
same as there was no difference in the "testimony and evidence" as Andrea Pullos merely 
memorized the words, "greatest public good and the least private injury" and other than 
this, there was nothing different submitted to the Court. 
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Appellant submits that when actions are meritorious and brought in good faith it is 
the tax payer who flips the bill. 
In a large measure it is the tax payer paying the costs and attorneys fees to have 
his own property taken. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain recognized this principle at G 15.01, wherein it states: 
In a trial against the condemnee, the condemning authority will pay for top 
notch lawyers and well-qualified surveyors, engineers, land planners, and real 
estate appraisers. The condemnor will employ extensive discovery and costly 
sales researches, photographs, videos, charts, and other demonstrative evidence. 
To be on an equal footing with the government in our adversary system of 
jurisprudence, and to utilize the constitutional provision of due process of law, the 
condemnee should also employ experienced lawyers and experts, such as 
surveyors, engineers, land use planners and real estate appraisers. The condemnee 
will need to employ experts whose qualifications can match the government's 
counterparts, and to use the same tools of persuasion as the government in its 
testimony and evidence. Because it is the taxpayer who pays the costs and fees of 
the condemnor's trial effort, the condemnee, ironically, pays to have the 
government oppose his or her clam as an individual owner. It would not seem 
unjust, then, to have the same tax revenues pay for the condemnee's legitimate 
defense in condemnation cases. 
Appellant submits that Nichols is suggesting that when the actions are legitimate 
then the Condemnee should have his costs and attorneys fees paid, hence all the more so 
when the action is without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the determination made at 
the trial level to deny fees and to limit costs and remand the same to the District Court to 
award attorneys fees for all efforts made at the Trial Court level as well as all the efforts 
on Appeal and to award every conceivable cost both at the Trial Court level as well as on 
Appeal. 
47 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dated this/r/ day of March, 2012. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered two true and correct copies of the 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the Plaintiff by hand delivering the same to DONALD H. 
HANSEN, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 2001 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 
#S3700, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84190. 
Dated th i^ /day of March, 2012. 
0 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
48 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
A. End Notes 
B. Notice of Appeal 
C. Order, Judgment and Decree 
D. Memorandum Decision re: Fees and Costs 
E. Affidavit on Costs 
F. Memorandum Decision re: Ruling on Condemnation Complaint 
G. Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice 
H. Order Denying Motion for Immediate Occupancy 
I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
J. Minute Entry - Denial of Motion for Immediate Occupancy 
K. Defendant's #4 - Fire Code 
L. Defendant's #7 - Letter by Donald H. Hansen re: Turnaround 
M. Defendant's #17 - Parking Lot - 12 Stalls 
N. Defendant's #19 - Condemn parts of Lots #25, #26, #27 and #28, Block 8, The Groves 
O. Defendant's #24 - Five Parking Stalls 
P. Defendant's #32 - Resolution No. 2113 - Limit road to 13 feet plus 1 foot shoulders 
Q. Defendant's #35 - Salt Lake County Commissioner Brent Overson re: Fence off 
R. Defendant's #38 — Schematic of Water Tanks 
S. Defendant's #41 - Topographical Map on location of Water Tanks 
T. Defendant's #90 - County Snow Plow not make it up narrow road 
U. Defendant's #91 - County Snow Plow not make it up narrow road 
V. Defendant's #92 - County Snow Plow not make it up narrow road 
W. Defendant's 117 - Picture showing flat area - Plenty of area - No need for retaining walls 
X. Defendant's #159 - County Road Map - Basis for Court's ruling 
Y. Defendant's #167 - This is Ex. #127 with xxx for retaining walls 
Z. Defendant's #169-E - County Road Map - Basis for Court's ruling 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 2 9 2012 
Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(f)(1) ^\ A i i r\ n r7 ~ A/f 
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and Type 
Style Requirements 
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.24(f)( 1) because: 
0 this brief contains > ~ D [number of] words, excluding the parts of 
the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l )(B), or 
• this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [number of] 
lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Utah R. App. 
P.24(f)(l)(B). 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) because: 
B this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 
Mirrngnft- o f f i c e 2Q(j)?amg fln^ vers^on of word processing program] in 
Times New Roman 13 [font size and name of types style], or 
• this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using 
/ ) [name and version of word processing program] 
with (,,^j \ [name of characters per inch and name of type style]. 
Attorney's 0r Party's Name 
Dated: March 28 , 2012 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
END NOTES-
1. Note Record at pages 1-34 
2. Note Record at pagel 1 and also Record at page 68 
3. Note Record at page 2 
4. Note Record at page 8 
5. Note Record at page 7 
6. Note Record at page 35 also note Transcript of Sixth day of Trial at page 29. 
7. Note Record at page 1354 
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9. Note Defendant's Exhibit No. 160 - Transcript May 8, 2008 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371 
3191 SOUTH VALLEY STREET, SUITE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: (801) 467-9700 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooooooOooooooo 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 




; Civil No. 070913769 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ; Judge Faust 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, 
ooooooooOoooooooo 
Comes now the Defendant, Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation, a Utah 
Corporation and appeals the Findings, Conclusions, Judgment, Order and Decree of August 16, 
2011 denying the award of attorneys fees and limiting the award of costs by the Honorable 
Robert Faust, Third Judicial District Court Judge to the Utah Supreme Court. 
SEpum 
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°epwi V Clerk 
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ith Dated this 12"1 day of September, 2011. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL to the Plaintiff by mailing the same to DONALD HANSEN, DEPUTY COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 2001 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE S3700, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
84190. 
Dated this 12th day of September, 2011. 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371 
3191 SOUTH VALLEY STREET, SUITE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: (801) 467-9700 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooooooOooooooo 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
Corporate and politic of the State ' ; ' • • • 
Of Utah, ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
; Civil No. 070913769 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ; Judge Faust 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, 
ooooooooOoooooooo 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for an Evidentiary Hearing on the Plaintiff, 
Salt Lake County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, before the Honorable Robert Faust, 
District Court Judge, on May 8TH, May 9™, June 6™ and June 10™, 2008 and then again on all 
remaining issue's on February 16th and February 17th, 2011, each time with the Plaintiff, Salt 
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District Attorneys and the Defendant, Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation, 
appearing by and through John Walsh, Attorney at Law and the Court after making a site visit to 
the subject property on May 8™, 2008, and hearing the testimony of the various witnesses and 
considering all of the exhibits and evidence adduced, and after entering its FINDINGS OF FACT 
and CONCLUSONS OF LAW and ruling on all Post Trial Motions, now for good cause 
appearing does hereby, 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs Complaint, Amended Complaint and all claims arising there from are 
hereby denied and dismissed on the merits and with prejudice. 
2. Defendant is hereby awarded judgment for costs in the sum of $ 1,199.3 3. 
3. Each side shall bear their own attorneys fees. 
4. All other issues are hereby resolved and therefore this is the Final Order and Judgment 
in this matter. 
Dated this ftSday of August, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
SU~A 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
v.-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the ORDER, JUDMENT AND 
DECREE, to the Plaintiff by mailing the same in the United States Mails, postage fully prepaid, 
addressed to Donald H. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite 
#S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84190. 
Dated this 10th day of August, 2011. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1/ 
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FILED BitTKiST COURI 
Third Judicial District 
AU8 C3 2011 
SALT LAKE (JoU^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 




CASE NO. 070913769 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment. 
I. 
The matter before the Court arises from an eminent domain action 
which trial was held on February 16 and 17, 2011. On March 16, 2011, the 
Court entered its decision denying the County's Petition as the final 
Judgment in the case; however, the decision did not address an award of 
attorney's fees or costs. 
On March 24, 2011, Defendant filed its first Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, seeeking an award of fees in this case. On May 25, 2011, 
this Court issued a Ruling denying Defendant's Motion. Specifically, this 
Court held that Defendant's Motion failed to satisfy the requirements set 
forth in Section 78B-5-825 of the Utah Code. Section 78B-5-825 requires 
a finding that the action was meritless and that the 
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Plaintiff acted in bad faith in bringing the action in order for 
attorney's fees to be awarded. This Court found that Plaintiff's actions 
in regards to the Petition did not rise to the level of "bad faith." 
Now, the Court considers a second Motion from Defendant to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, which requests the awarding of attorney's fees and costs. 
This Motion consists of (a) an accompanying exhibit that provides 
information of what "costs" are now claimed, and (b) an argument that § 
78B-5-825 was not the only basis on which Defendant has requested and is 
entitled to attorney fees, and (c) an argument that Kevin Anderson (an 
attorney other than the Defendant) had provided assistance during the 
initial part of this litigation and had a separate billing for his work. 
The Court addresses these arguments. 
II. 
Rule 59(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that 
"except when express provision...is made either in a statute of this 
state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Accordingly, 
Defendant has'-provided an Affidavit detailing which costs it seeks to 
have awarded. Plaintiff counters by arguing that (a) the Defendant 
failed to file the Motion for costs within the five-day time frame 
allotted by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(d)(2), and (b) Defendant 
requests awards for costs that Utah law expressly forbids. 
Rule 59(d)(2) requires that the Motion to recover costs must be 
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filed "within five days after the entry of judgment." Defendant filed 
their Motion to recover on June 7, 2011. Plaintiff argues that Defendant 
was required to file within five days of the Judgment entered on March 
23, 2011 (which would place the Motion outside the time frame). While 
Defendant doesn't address the issue, it is inferred that the Defendant 
argues the time frame was triggered by the more recent decision entered 
on May 25, 2011 (which, considering mailing time and business days, would 
place the Motion inside the time frame). While the Plaintiff's arguments 
have been considered, the Court holds that the Motion is timely. 
The Court now addresses which costs claimed in Defendant's exhibit 
are entitled to awarded. Plaintiff correctly argues that, per Utah law, 
expert witness fees are not recoverable costs in a civil action. See, 
John Call Encr'g v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 683 (Utah App. 1990). 
As a result, the $3,000 spent on appraiser Jerry Webber, the $1,420 spent 
on engineer Tosh Kano, the $2,400 spent on Blake Karrington and $5,373.12 
spent on engineer Matthew Roblez cannot be recovered as costs as the 
Defendant requests. 
Additionally, many of the items listed on Defendant's exhibit are 
referred to only as UAMT Printing" and "Office Max." It is inferred that 
these costs relate to printing and copying charges. Giusti v. Sterling 
Wentworth Corp. recently held that printing and copying are not within 
the definition of costs. As a result, all costs referred to as "AMT 
Printing" or "Office Max," as well as those explicitly referred to as 
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copying or printing costs, are denied. 
Defendant also requests compensation for "Courthouse parking" (costs 
referred to as "Matheson Courthouse" are assumed to be parking fees as 
well) . There is no precedent for awarding costs for parking, and the 
Court sees no reason to set one now and denies the same. 
Considering the above, only a handful of items from the Defendant's 
requests for costs remain: 
- Jury Demand 
- Four depositions (three labeled "DepoMax Merit," one 
labeled "Q&A Reporting Inc") 
- A refund related to a deposition ("DepoMax Merit Refund") 
- A cost referred to as "Smith's" 
- A cost labeled "Salt Lake County Surveyor" 
- A cost labeled "Clerk - Audio Tape Copy" 
A cost labeled "Salt Lake County Recorder's Office" 
- A cost labeled "Postage" 
The first two of these bulleted items could qualify for an award of 
"costs." The remaining six items are not awarded due to vagueness or 
lack of case law establishing them as recoverable costs. The minimal 
nature of their descriptions, combined with the low corresponding cash 
values, suggests a plethora of interpretations as to; what the money was 
actually spent on, ranging from parking to paperwork, to office supplies, 
to food. As a result, the Court does not award a recovery of costs to 
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any item other than the Jury Demand for $75.00 and four depositions in 
the amount of $1,124.33, resulting in a total of $1,199.33 in costs, 
which is hereby awarded to Defendant. 
III. 
Defendant's remaining arguments deal with the recovery of attorney's 
fees. By the way of background, after the Motion for Immediate Occupancy 
was denied, the Plaintiff on December 10, 2008 filed a Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice. As a result the Court granted 
attorney fees to Defendant based upon § 78B-6-517. However, because the 
Plaintiff had not met all of the conditions of dismissal, the Court had 
to vacate its prior rulings on both the dismissal of the action and the 
award of attorney fees to Defendant. See Minute Entry dated April 9, 
2009. 
In Defendant's second motion it alleges that the Court erred in its 
May 25, 2011 ruling in stating that "Defendant appears to concede that 
there is no other authority [than § 78B-5-825]" to support an award of 
attorney's fees. Defendant asserts it stated in both its first Motion 
to Amend and the current Motion, it relies on several statues and Utah 
case law specific to eminent domain cases for an award of attorney fees. 
Defendant specifically points to §§ 78B-6-509 and 78B-6-517 of the Utah 
Code and the cases of Provo City Corporation v. Cropper and Cornish Town 
v. Koller to prove its argument that Utah case law is "very liberal" in 
awarding costs and attorney's fees in condemnation cases. 
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Defendant's arguments are problematic for several reasons. While 
Defense points to §§ 78B-6-509 and -517 to argue that Utah law 
contemplates ua much broader analysis" for awarding costs and fees in 
eminent domain and condemnation cases, the Defendant never specifies how 
the current case benefits from this "lower standard." Specifically, § 
78B-6-517 and the two Utah cases cited deal with instances where the 
condemner abandons the proceedings and causes the action to be dismissed 
with prejudice. While an abandonment of the case may have appeared to 
happen in this case, such was set aside by the Court. See Minute Entry 
dated April 9, 2009. In addition, the previous scenario does not 
accurately describe this case since that date or the trial on merits on 
Plaintiff's amended Petition. 
Defendant also relies on a previous finding of fact made by the 
Court on October 23, 2008, which stated Salt Lake County had not "acted 
reasonably or in good faith in this condemnation action." In 
understanding this finding of fact, it is important to note that this 
language and conclusion dealt solely with a Motion for Immediate 
Occupancy, and was not rendered on the merits of the Petition as modified 
and as tried to the Court. The Court has not and does not find Plaintiff 
acted in bad faith on the Amended Petition tried to the Court and will 
not grant attorney fees to Defendant on that basis. Further, it was 
never the Court's intent in its use of language that Salt Lake County had 
not "acted reasonably or in good faith in this condemnation action" to 
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determine bad faith by the Plaintiff to justify and upon which to base 
an award of attorney fees to Defendant, especially when such was being 
said in the limited context of the issue of immediate occupancy. 
Further, Defendant desires the Court to use the definition of "bad 
faith," in Cadv v. Johnson, in regards to awarding attorney's fees by 
using a three-pronged test: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (2) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to or acted 
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder or 
defraud others. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1993). Satisfying any one of these 
three, per Cady, would support a finding of bad faith. The Court does 
not find any of the three prongs above occurred in this case. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, Plaintiff's proceeding on an 
amended Petition does much to undermine a finding of bad faith. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff merely "went through the motions" during 
the litigation after the denial of immediate occupancy, relying 
predominantly on the conduct of Andrea Pullos and an inferred desire to 
avoid the attorney' s fees that would have been awarded had the Complaint 
remained unmodified. The evidence does not support a finding that the 
Plaintiff acted in bad faith, even using the definition proposed by 
Defendant as set forth in Cady. Plaintiffs modified their Complaint, 
proceeded with litigation and generally showed that they believed the 
Motion to be a worthwhile cause. 
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Additionally, the subsequent litigation undermines Defendant's §§ 
78B-6-509 and 78B-6-517 claims to attorney's fees. As the Supreme Court 
noted in Cornish Town v. Koller , "an actual abandonment and dismissal 
must first occur." While an abandonment and dismissal initially did 
occur, it was (as aforementioned) withdrawn and the Petition was amended. 
IV. 
Finally, Defendant seeks an award of attorney's fees on the basis 
of hiring attorney Kevin Anderson, presumably in an effort to circumvent 
the suggestion in this Court's May 25, 2011 ruling that "pro se 
litigants, even those who are also attorneys, are not entitled to recover 
attorney's fees." In its Memorandum, Plaintiff notes that Mr. Anderson 
only represented the Defendant during. Mr. Walsh's testimony, a time 
period that lasted "only a few hours." Nonetheless, Defendant alleges 
that Mr. Anderson's services cost it "thousands and thousands" of 
dollars. 
The Court finds the Defendant's argument here unpersuasive for 
several reasons. First, Mr. Anderson's services appear, without any 
further evidence, to be relatively minimal and the statute does not 
provide for attorney fees in the circumstance of this case where the 
condemnation action was not abandoned and dismissed as a result. Second, 
there is no Affidavit from Mr. Anderson or Defendant as to the attorney 
fees relating to Mr. Anderson's work. 
V. 
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Additionally, Defendant's Motion comes close to being nothing more 
than a Motion for Reconsideration, which is not allowed under Utah law. 
Except on the issue of costs, by Defendant's own admission, much of the 
Motion consists of restatements or clarifications of arguments which were 
included in their first Motion but felt this Court overlooked or 
misinterpreted. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. 
Defendant may recover costs for the items detailed above to the 
amount of $1,199.33. However, awards for all other costs and attorney's 
fees are denied. 
Dated this 3rd day of August, 2011. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
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BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ; Judge Faust 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JOHN WALSH, being first duly sworn on his oath deposes and says that the following is 
true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief: 
1. Affiant is Counsel of Record in the above entitled action and therefore his first hand 
knowledge of the facts and circumstances that follow. 
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^ " 2. Affiant prepared Exhibit A attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein, 
which reflects a total in costs of $13,949.52. 
3. Affiant submits that this total is correct of his own personal knowledge and belief and 
the sums were a reasonable amount for the item or service provided and that the same were 
necessarily incurred in this action. 
4. Affiant submits that the Defendant is entitled to the said sum of $13,949.52 based 
upon Cornish Town vs. Koller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah, 1991) which provides that the Defendant is 
entitled "in covering every conceivable expense, damage and costs in order to protect the owners 
of private property." 
Dated this 2nd day of June, 2011. 
JOYtifi WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
• i/ 
VERIFICATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 46-5-101,1 declare under criminal penalty of 
the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Dated this 2nd day of June, 2011. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT ON 
COSTS to the Plaintiff by mailing the same to DONALD HANSEN, DEPUTY COUNTY 
ATTORNEY, 2001 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE S3700, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
84190. 
Dated this 2nd day of June, 2011. 
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EXHBIT A - COSTS 
10/17/07 - Jury Demand - $75.00 
01/17/08 -DepoMax Merit-Linda Hamilton $381.49 
01/17/08 -DepoMax Merit-Andrea Pullos $292.94 
02/08/08 - Salt Lake County Surveyor - $10.00 
03/06/08 - Copies - Courthouse $2.25 
03/19/08 - Salt Lake County Recorders Office $2.00 
04/01/08 - Jerry Webber - $2,000.00 
04/08/08 -Copies-Courthouse $7.35 
04/22/08 -AMT Printing-$23.36 
04/23/08 -AMTPrinting-$30.97 
05/05/08 -OfficeMax $74.67 
05/05/08 -AMTPrinting-$95.40 
05/06/08 - Office Max (Refund) ($21.32) 
05/06/08 -AMTPrinting-$5.31 
05/08/08 - Courthouse Parking $8.00 
06/05/08 -AMTPrinting-$3.21 
06/06/08 - Courthouse Parking $8.00 
06/09/08 - Clerk - Audio Tape Copy - $10.00 
06/10/08 - Courthouse Parking $4.00 
07/16/08 - Courthouse Parking $4.00 
12/11/08 - Courthouse Parking - $4.00 
12/12/08 -Copies$16.05 
8/19/10-Office Max $21.16 
8/19/10-A.M.T. $45.30 
8/19/10 - Matheson Courthouse $2.00 
8/19/10-Copying $16.75 
8/20/10 - Office Max $21.77 
8/23/10-A.M.T. $49.53 
9/7/10 - DepoMaxMerit $300.00 
9/7/11 - Matheson Courthouse - $2.00 
9/9/10-Smiths $6.40 
9/9/10-A.M.T. $3.59 
9/16/10 - Matheson Courthouse $4.00 
10/29/10 - DepoMaxMerit Refund $9.30 
11/19/10-A.M.T. $53.30 
11/19/11 - Jerry Webber $1,000.00 
11/30/1- Matheson Courthouse $.40 
12/21/10 - Matheson Courthouse $4.00 
1/28/11 - Q and A Reporting Inc. Karrington $149.90 
1/31/11 - Matheson Courthouse $2.00 
2/1/11 - Matheson Courthouse $2.00 
2/3/11 - Matheson Courthouse $.25 
2/3/11 - Matheson Courthouse $6.00 
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2/16/11 - Matheson Courthouse $8.00 
2/17/11 - Matheson Courthouse $8.00 
3/8/11 - Tosh Kano $1,420.00 
3/10/11 - Blake Karrington $2,400.00 
3/22/11-Postage $4.07 
4/1/11 - Matthew Roblez/McNeil Engineering $5,373.12 
TOTAL $13,949.52 
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mm DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
m ic^cii 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUI^ f 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 070913769 
vs. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
This condemnation action by- Salt Lake County (the "County") came 
before the Court on February 16-17, 2011. The Court has reviewed the 
relevant legal authority and has considered the testimony adduced at the 
hearing and the exhibits which were entered into evidence. Being now 
fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
As factual background, this is a condemnation action brought by the 
County which contemplates taking a portion of the Defendant's land for 
the purpose of enlarging the current turnaround in the Pinecrest area of 
Emigration Canyon. At the request of and in the presence of both parties, 
the Court made an on-site inspection of the location involved in the 
proposed condemnation. 
On May 8 and 9, 2008, and June 6 and 10, 2008, the Court heard the 
County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy. The principal issue at that 
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time was whether, under Utah Code Ann., § 78-34-5(1), the County had 
located the proposed turnaround in a manner that would be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private injury. At the time, 
the County proposed to condemn approximately 787 square feet of the 
subject property ("the original proposal") . Ultimately, the Court, denied 
the County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy. 
Thereafter and before this current trial, the County modified the 
shape/configuration of the property to be taken which resulted in the 
County reducing the amount of property sought in the condemnation from 
approximately 787 square feet to approximately 111 square feet, ("the 
reduced proposal") . Both parties conducted additional discovery and took 
depositions regarding the proposed change to the final plan of 
condemnation. 
The Court notes that the County has met the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann., § 78B-6-504, with the reduced proposal. However, in addition 
to the requirements of § 78B-6-504, the parties agree that the Court must 
determine whether the County has located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner that would be most compatible with the greatest public good and 
cause the least private injury. The County has not met this standard. 
The County modified the shape/configuration of the property to be 
taken and reduced it to 111 square feet. Initially, it appears that this 
modified proposal will reduce the impact to the private property owner. 
However, in reality the injury to the private property owner is as great 
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as it was under the original proposal. This fact is due to the unique 
zoning, building and parking requirements in Emigration Canyon. The 
Court finds that the taking of even 111 square feet at this particular 
location would result in almost a total loss of the value of the lot at 
its highest value. 
Initially, Mr. Webber, MAI, one of the experts testifying in this 
case, provided a report which placed the value of the property to be 
taken under the original plan to be $105,000.00. See Exhibit 150. Mr. 
Webber, however, testified at trial the value of the 111 square feet to 
be taken in the amended condemnation would be only $5,000.00. The reason 
given by Mr. Webber for the $100,000.00 decrease in value is due to the 
supposed decrease in the impact upon the remaining property after the 
taking. For the original proposal, Mr. Webber determined approximately 
50% of the land area which could be built upon would be taken and, 
therefore, the remaining property was not sufficient to be used as a 
residence. Under the modified proposal, Mr. Webber assumed that a 1,350 
square foot home could still be built on the property. Therefore, the 
remaining property remained useable for residential building. However, 
Mr. Webber's assumptions were based upon other assumptions which proved 
unreliable. Specifically, Mr. Webber believed that the water tanks would 
be removed entirely off of the property under both scenarios, and not 
merely shifted or moved on-site. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Under cross-examination, Mr. Webber acknowledged the entire parcel 
could be rendered unuseable as a residential site under the modified 
proposal if the tanks remained on the lot and just moved or shifted to 
a different location on the same lot and testified the Defendant's 
damages would be very near to the damages under the original proposal. 
See record at 10:06-9, 10. Mr. Webber's concessions are supported by-
Blake Karrington's testimony. Mr. Karrington testified that moving the 
tanks on the lot would critically limit where support columns or footings 
could be placed for the construction of a residence and the needed 
parking. This fact would in effect render the remaining property 
unuseable as a building lot. 
In addition, the Court finds the County did not prove that 
relocating the water tanks off of the lot entirely and replacing them at 
a new location is a feasible solution. Certainly this would encumber a 
new location and this relocation was not included in the calculations of 
damages resulting from any taking. The County failed to specifically 
indicate where the water tanks would be relocated or what impact there 
may be to the property upon which the tanks were relocated. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Court concludes in applying 
the balancing it is required to do, it should consider the loss of the 
entire parcel, not just the 111 square feet which would be transferred 
to the County as proposed. The Court must then weigh this loss against 
the public good which would result from the condemnation. 
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Ms. Pullos testified for the County regarding the County's efforts 
to enlarge the turnabout. She stated that she was the sole person who 
determined the location and extent of both the original and amended 
taking in this case. Ms. Pullos testified she did not consider the 
turnaround as a whole, looking for options that did not include taking 
Defendant's property. Instead, she only considered what she could do on 
that corner of the turnaround involving this property in view of what of 
what had already occurred relating to the turnaround in the other three 
corners thereof and she testified that she wanted to use a standard 
radius on Roosevelt Trail. Ms. Pullos acknowledged she had no knowledge 
of the size, depth or orientation of the water tanks on the property and 
she was only aware of the locations of ..the openings to the water tanks. 
Ms. Pullos testified she limited her amended design because she only 
considered the property that had been already acquired by the County. 
Ms. Pullos did not adequately consider alternative property that could 
be condemned with less impact upon private landowners. Further, Ms. 
Pullos acknowledged she has heard no complaints about the present 
turnaround configuration that is in place. Ms. Pullos testified she did 
not factor in whether the modified proposal would go over the water 
tanks. For this modified proposal, Ms. Pullos again did not consider 
anything more than what the County already had in its possession for 
property in the other three corners of the turnaround. The County, 
however, failed to properly consider property it already owns and whether 
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it could be utilized to effectuate a turnaround without the taking of 
this property. Also, the County, through Ms. Pullos, failed to properly 
consider 8 to 10 feet of property which is already paved and another 10 
feet from the edge of the blacktop to the foliage which is unused to the 
east. Some of this property is already owned by the County and some of 
it is privately owned but is in reality already being currently used as 
a turnaround even though it is not within the currently designed 
turnaround. 
The Court finds the taking and use of the property to the east as 
mentioned above, would pose significantly less private injury and less 
cost to the County and public than the modified proposal, even though 
more than 111 square feet may ultimately have to be taken. As 
mentioned, the properties to the east are currently being used as part 
of the turnaround and as an entrance to a private roadway/driveway. Even 
though more land than 111 square feet may have to be taken, the land 
value per sq. ft. is substantially less than' the. property currently 
proposed. Further, taking the land to the east would not result in the 
loss of a building site, which value is approximately $105,000.00 and 
which would also include the costs of the movement of the water tanks on 
its current lot which is estimated to be $25,000.00. The Court 
recognizes that if the water tanks on Defendant's property were relocated 
to a completely new site, the damages to the lot would not be close to 
the $105,000.00, because the remaining lot would or could still be used 
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as a residential lot. However, the damages and cost for impacting the 
property upon which the tanks were relocated would have to be provided 
and included. 
The modified proposal simply adds a curve or radius to a corner to 
assist larger vehicles in backing up, so when they drive forward the 
front end of the vehicle is more in the direction of travel i.e., down 
the canyon. Under the modified proposal, a vehicle pulling into 
Roosevelt Trail and then backing up while turning to match the proposed 
curve has 29.00 ft of curvature but cnly 20 ft in depth in a straight 
line to back up. See Exhibit 159. However, under the status quo, 
vehicles effectuate a turn around without needing to stop and backup. 
Larger trucks and vehicles needing to turn around can presently pull into 
Roosevelt Trail and have a distance., of 102 feet to back up in a straight 
direction to help effectuate their turn, rather than 20 ft. to 29 ft. 
See Exhibit 169E. 
After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the 
hearing, the Court finds that the County's amended design of the proposed 
turnaround is not uhe most compatible ,with the greatest public good and 
the least private injury aijd" was done without adequately considering the 
impact on the adjoining lands, use of adjoining lands to effectuate a 
turnaround, the water system currently in place, and the parking 
situation and its impact on future development. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 8 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Based on the foregoing, the County's Petition for Condemnation is 
denied. This Memorandum Decision shall serve as the Order in this 
matter. No further order need be prepared by counsel. 
Dated this 15th day of March, 2011. 
^". 
ROBERT P. FAUS^ 
DISTRICT COURT J U M & \ ~^&^ 
// 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this 15th day of March, 2011: 
Donald H. Hansen 
David H.T. Wayment 
Deputy District Attorneys 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Defendant 
3191 S. Valley Street, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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LOHRA L. MILLER (USB #6420) 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DONALD H. HANSEN (USB #1332) 
DAVID H. T. WAYMENT (USB #5159) 
Deputy District Attorneys 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3421 
Facsimile: (801)468-2622 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUTLER CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 070913769 
Judge ROBERT FAUST 
Pursuant to UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 41 (a)(2)(ii), Plaintiff Salt Lake County, 
by and through its counsel of record, hereby moves the court for an order dismissing the above-
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DATED this December 5,2008. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
[DO^ALEjJfrHANSEN 
"H. T. WAYMENT 
Deputy District Attorneys 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FOR 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE was duly served upon counsel for the defendant 
by United States First Class mail, postage prepaid, as follows: 
John T.Walsh 
Attorney at Law 
3191 South Valley Street 
Suite #230P 
Salt Lake City UT 84109 
Attorney for BUTLER CROCKETT & WALSH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
Kevin E. Anderson 
Attorney at Law 
60 East South Temple Street 
Suite #1200 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Attorney for BUTLER CROCKETT & WALSH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation 
DATED this Q ^ day of X t s ^ - , 200 <sPT 
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JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371 
3191 SOUTH VALLEY STREET, SUITE 230 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: (801) 467-9700 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
, STATE OF UTAH 
oooooodOooooooo 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body j 
Corporate and politic of the State ; i 
Of Utah, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
; IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
Plaintiff, ! j 
Vs. ( 
j; Civil No. 070913769 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, :; Judge Faust 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, ;! 
ooooooooOoooooooo 
! I '' ' 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for an Evidentiary Hearing on the 
Plaintiff, Salt Lake County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, before the Honorable 
Robert Faust, District Court Judge, on May 8TH, May 9TH, June 6TH and June 10™, 2008, 
with the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County appearing by and through Donald H. Hansen and 
David H. T. Wayment, Deputy District Attorne) s, and the Defendant, Butler, Crockett 
FILia DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
* $ 
NOV - 6 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
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and Walsh Development Corporation, appearing by and through John Walsh, Attorney at 
Law and Kevin Egan Anderson, Attorney at Law, and the Court after making a site visit 
to the subject property on May 8TH, 2008, and hearing the testimony of the various 
witnesses and considering all of the exhibits and evidence adduced, and after entering its 
FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSONS OF LAW now for good cause appearing 
does hereby, 
ORDER, that the Plaintiffs Motion for Immediate Occupancy is hereby denied . 
Dated th i s^_ day of August? 2008. 
Ufatc&- BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, to the Plaintiff by mailing the same to 
Donald H. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite #S3700, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84190. 
Dated this 14th day of August, 2008. 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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FILM BISTMCT COW? 
Third Judicial District 
JOHN WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371 
3191 SOUTH VALLEY STREET, SUITE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84109 
Telephone: (801) 467-9700 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooooooOooooooo 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
Corporate and politic of the State ; 
Of Utah, FINDINGS OF FACT 
; AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Vs. 
; Civil No. 070913769 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ; Judge Faust 
A Utah Corporation, -
s . .. 
Defendant, 
ooooooooOooooooco 
The above entitled matter came on regularh for au Evidentiary Hearing on the 
Plaintiff, Salt Lake County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, before the Honorable 
Robert Faust, District Court Judge, on May 8™, May 9TH, June 6TH and June 10™, 2008, 
with the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County appearing by and through Donald H. Hansen and 
• s r -
OCT 2 3 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Giark 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
David H. T. Wayment, Deputy District Attorneys, and the Defendant, Butler, Crockett 
and Walsh Development Corporation, appearing by and through John Walsh, Attorney at 
Law and Kevin Egan Anderson, Attorney at Law, and the Court after making a site visit 
to the subject property on May 8TH, 2008, and hearing the testimony of the various 
witnesses and considering all of the exhibits and evidence adduced, now for good cause 
appearing makes and adopts the following, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff, Salt Lake County, initiated this condemnation action and 
served the Defendant, Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation, on 
September 24th, 2007. 
2. That the stated purpose of the said condemnation action is to provide a bigger 
and safer turnaround at the approximate intersection of Burrs Lane and Roosevelt Trial, 
in the Pinecrest area of Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County, State of Utah as reflected 
in Defendant's Exhibit #118. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered 
what properties already belonged to Salt Lake County versus property that required a 
taking from private property owners. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
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areas of public property in the same vicinity of the proposed turnaround where Salt Lake 
County could stockpile snow, as reflected in Exhibits #125, #126, #128 and #130. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that Salt Lake County already had a snow blower and front end loader that Salt Lake 
County utilizes in the same area as the turnaround, as the need arises, to remove snow 
and ice from the existing road and turnaround area. Hence, Salt Lake County has 
alternative locations in which to stock pile snow without taking any of the Defendant's 
property. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that east side of the proposed turnaround as well as the east side of the road, have far 
better potential for melting the snow than the west side as the west side had much more 
shade because of the evergreen trees on the west side as well as the mountain side, all of 
which shade the area she had designed for snow storage. Hence, getting the snow to melt 
more quickly, would be an advantage to Salt Lake County for snow removal purposes 
and the potential for the same would exist after every snow fall all winter long. 
7. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that the stream provided a never ending source to deposit the snow, which is where 
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the snow plows plow the snow anyway, and therefore there would be no need to take any 
of the Defendant's property for storing or stock piling snow. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that Salt Lake County had paved the area of public land reflected in Defendant's 
Exhibit #129, which was outside of the proposed turnaround Ms. Pullos had designed. 
Andrea Pullos testified as reflected in Defendant's Exhibit #1, at page 27, " . . . the 
conceptual plan leaves part of the blacktop area unused on the eas t . . . (which was ) . . . 
eight to ten feet..." 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that Salt Lake County had an additional ten feet from edge of black top to edge of 
foliage to move the turnaround to the east, or to stock pile snow which was totally unused 
in the proposed turnaround Ms. Pullos had designed. Note Defendant's Exhibit #1, at 
page 28. 
10. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered 
how much snow builds up in front of the Defendant's stone entrance and gate. As noted 
in Defendant's Exhibits #74 and #81, the build up of snow in front of the wall is a major 
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factor to have overlooked, as this significantly affects how much area is available for 
turnaround purposes and how much is needed for stockpiling snow. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
damages caused to the three water tanks and well head on the west side, whereas there 
are none of the same on the east side, should the Plaintiff locate the said turnaround 
consistent with Defendant's Exhibit #127. Should the Defendant have to relocate the 
subject tanks, the loss sustained by the Defendant could be much more than the loss of 
the area for the said tanks, as Defendant would need to locate the said tanks on a different 
lot, assuming land is available. The resultant damages could potentially affect the whole 
water system, and thereby affect the potential development of many, many more lots than 
the mere taking of part of Lot 1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision, as proposed herein by 
Salt Lake County. 
12. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that the east side of the turnaround, where Defendant's proposes that the turnaround 
be placed as reflected in Defendant's Exhibit #127, had been used as a road area before 
and that the land owners had so utilized the said land as a road, whereas, on the West side 
the area had not been used as a road at any time. 
13. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the feast private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
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testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that the proposed taking would affect the Defendant most significantly as the taking 
would prevent development of Lots #1 and #2, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision as 
proposed by the landowner. The resulting damage to the Defendant would deprive the 
Defendant from having the requisite off street parking and therefore prevent development 
of Defendant's land far beyond the mere taking proposed by Salt Lake County. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
parking issue exactly the opposite way around. The proposed taking contemplates, itA- f*° i 
providing private parking for Thomas Johnson and others, who have historically feGSt pa*fc** 
ntuidieds rf places tepssk? whereas the proposed taking by Salt Lake County takes the 
only parking space for the Defendant and the taking of the requisite parking of the 
Defendant in reality prevents the Defendant from having a home on Lots #1 and #2, 
Block 9, The Groves Subdivision. The Court finds that the Defendant will have to 
demonstrate its off street parking on the site plan in order to get a building permit, and the 
taking by Salt Lake County herein, prevents the same as they propose to take all of the 
Defendant's land to toe of slope. The Court finds that the Defendant can not create 
additional parking to the north of the proposed taking, as the Army Corp of Engineers has 
prevented the same in the past as the same creates a culvert too long to be acceptable to 
the Corp. 
15 The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
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testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that Lot 1, Block 9, The Groves Subdivision was unique to the Defendant and very 
different than any other lot of the Defendant, in that this lot has access in the winter as the 
road is plowed to edge of this lot and such is not the case with any other lot of the 
Defendant. Additionally this lot had a culvert where the stream is protected and therefore 
the Defendant has unique development opportunities as the same would have less affect 
on the stream. Additionally this lot has electrical, gas, telephone and water already in 
place for development, etc. 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has no* located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact that there is sufficient flat area for the turnaround contemplated in Defendant's 
Exhibit #127. On Cross Examination Andrea Pullos showed die Court on the County 
survey map where the grades where such that there was sufficient flat area in order to 
build the turnaround as contemplated in Defendant's Exhibit #127. 
17 The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in 
a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had only considered 
pushing snow on Defendant's property for storage purposes. Note Defendant's Exhibit 
#1 at page 56 along with Defendant's Exhibit #86 and #94. The Court finds this analysis 
by Plaintiff to be flawed as merely pushing snow on Lot 1, Block 9, The Groves 
Subdivision in contrast to stock piling snow there, indicates to the Court that very little 
volume is contemplated in the same, whereas there is so much more volume available by 
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placing the snow on Roosevelt Trail to the East and Westjas well as the platted Burrs 
Lane, as reflected in Defendant's Exhibits #125, #128an| #130. 
18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
fact of how snow removal had historically been done in the area. The Court finds this to 
be most significant as a good part of the taking of the Defendant's land is for snow 
storage and other available sites for snow storage directlyj affects the County's need to 
take the Plaintiffs land for the same. 
19. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not located the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good, as Andrea Pullos 
testified that she had designed the said turnaround herself and she had not considered the 
potential costs in relocating the water tanks, other land that would be needed to relocate 
the tanks, and whether the whole water system would be affected and how the loss of 
water system could affect the development of unnumbered lots and hence the expense of 
putting the turnaround over the water tanks could be astronomical. 
20. The Court finds that Salt Lake County has not acted reasonably nor in good 
faith in this condemnation action and that the Order of Immediate Occupancy should be 
denied because: 
a. Salt Lake County gave no thought to the fact that there are imlkmted places to 
stock pile snow in the area, as reflected in Defendant's Exhibits #125, #128 and #130. 
b. Salt Lake County gave no thought as to snow blowing the snow on the East 
side of the stream and did not even factor in the fact that Salt Lake County already has 
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the equipment, has the manpower, and has historically used the said equipment in the 
same area of the turnaround, as Salt Lake County has needed the same to keep the road 
open during the winter months. Note Defendant's Exhibits #69, #70 and #71. 
c. Salt Lake County gave no thought to the' fact that there is much more sun to 
melt down the snow on the East side of the road and turnaround than the west on the 
Defendant's property because of the Evergreen trees and shade of the mountain as 
reflected in Exhibits #64, #65, #66 and #86. 
d. Salt Lake County gave no thought to the fact that Salt Lake County plows the 
snow with its accompanying salt, oil, antifreeze etc;; into the stream, all the way from the 
Zoo to the proposed turnaround and that the stream provides an never ending source for 
removing the ice and snow and water from the area. Note Exhibit #1, (which was 
admitted into evidence) at page 36. 
e. Salt Lake County gave no thought to the fact that there are no homes or 
structures on the East side of the road and turnaround where Salt Lake County could 
stock pile and snow blow the snow, whereas there are both homes and structures on the 
West side where Salt Lake County proposes to store the snow. Note Exhibit #64. 
f. Salt Lake County gave no thought as to the detrimental effect that the salt and 
oil and antifreeze, etc., (note Exhibits #75, #77 and #86) that commonly mix with snow 
can have not only on the two water tanks on the Defendant's property but also on the 
community water tank and system which is currently in place just below the two tanks of 
the Defendant. Note Defendant's Exhibit #141 with the fence around the community 
water tank. 
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g. In sharp contrast Salt Lake County gave no thought to the fact that on the East 
side of the turnaround there is many times the snow storage capacity than on the 
Defendant's property to the West. Note Defendant' s Exhibit #103. 
21. As to the claim made by the Defendant that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County invoked their power of eminent 
domain arbitrarily, the Court finds as follows: 
a. The proposed turnaround by Salt Lake County contemplates the taking on one-
hundred per cent of the flat area on the Defendant's side of the said turnaround, while at 
the same time, the proposal leaves several feet to the East totally abandoned. At pages 27 
and 28 of Defendant's Exhibit #1, Andrea Pullos testified that she left 8 to 10 feet of 
black top unused on the East and another 10 feet from black top to foliage unused to the 
East. 
r b. The proposed turnaround by Salt Lake County contemplates taking the only 
parking space for the Defendant's proposed development of Lots #1 and #2, Block 9, The 
Groves subdivision, while at the same time the proposed turnaround provides for several 
private parking spaces for Thomas Johnson and others on Lots #30 and #31, Block 7, The 
Groves Subdivision. Note Defendant's Exhibit #11&.. 
22. The Court finds that Salt Lake County has not acted reasonably nor in good 
faith in this condemnation action and that the Order of immediate Occupancy should be 
denied because the proposed turnaround by Salt Lake County contemplates the taking of 
the property of the Defendant in order to make a turnaround or road on Defendant's 
property, where Defendant contemplates building a home, whereas Salt Lake County is 
abandoning the turnaround area to the East which has no other intended purpose and 
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historically has been used as a road. Note Defendant's Exhibit #129, which shows 
blacktopped area that Salt Lake County is abandoning m their proposal. 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not lopated the proposed turnaround in a 
manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury and the greatest 
public good. 
24. The by virtue of all of the foregoing the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not 
acted reasonably nor in good faith and that the Motion of Immediate Occupancy should 
be denied for arbitrariness. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,.ihe Court now makes and adopts the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
25. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not located the subject 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the least private injury, as 
required by 78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
26. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has not located the subject 
turnaround in a manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good as 
required by 78-34-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
27. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has acted arbitrarily as 
contemplated in Salt Lake County vs. Rammoselli. 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1977). 
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28. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because there is no 
necessary as contemplated in Salt Lake County m 
1977) and as set out in the Utah Code Annbtated||78-34-4. 
29. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake County has abused its discretion in the 
proposed taking as contemplated in Bountiful vs 
peed, for the taking and the taking is not 
Rammoselll 567 P.2d 182 (Utah, 
30. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy should be denied because Salt Lake 
| .* 
good faith in the proposed taking as contemplate) 
(Utah, 179) also Bountiful vs. Swift. 535 P.2d i|36 (Utah, 1975). 
Dated this >_ day of September, 2008. 
Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975). 
touiity has not acted reasonably nor in 
in UDOT vs. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 
BY THE COURT: 
TRTGT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to the Plaintiff by mailing the same to 
Donald H. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite #S3700, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84190. 
Dated this 17th day of September, 2008. 
JOHN/WALSH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate : MINUTE ENTRY 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
: CASE NO. 070913769 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah : 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing in 
connection with Salt Lake County's (the "County") Motion for Immediate 
Occupancy on May 8 - 9 , June 6 and 10, 2008. At the conclusion of the 
hearing on June 6, 2008, the Court gave counsel the opportunity to file 
supplemental briefs. The Court has now had an opportunity to consider 
the parties' supplemental materials, as well as their proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In addition, the Court has reviewed the 
relevant legal authority and has again considered the testimony adduced 
at the hearing and the exhibits which were entered into evidence. Being 
now fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
i 
As factual background, the Court notes that this is a condemnation 
action brought by the County which contemplates taking a portion of the 
Defendant's land for the purpose of enlarging the current turnaround and 
to provide parking in the approximate area of Burrs Lane and Roosevelt 
Trail, in the Pinecrest area of Emigration Canyon. 
The principal issue presented by the Defendant is whether, under 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-34-5(1), the County has located the proposed 
turnaround in a manner that would be most compatible with the greatest 
public good and the least private injury. The parties agree that it is 
procedurally appropriate for the Court to apply Section 78-34-5(1) at 
this stage in the condemnation process so that the Court can ultimately 
determine whether an Order of Immediate Occupancy should be entered. 
After weighing the testimony and evidence that was presented at the 
hearing, the Court finds that the County designed the proposed turnaround 
without adequately considering the impact on the adjoining land, the 
water systems currently in place, the burden of additional snow storage 
on the Defendant's property, and the parking situation and its resulting 
impact on future development. Indeed, it appears that the County already 
owned certain property, the use of which for a modified turnaround would 
have posed significantly less private injury. Yet, the testimony of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
Andrea Pullos, a Salt Lake County Engineer, suggests other designs which 
could have incorporated this land and which would have been potentially 
less injurious, were not considered. In addition, the design which she 
ultimately proposed simply did not take into full account specific 
factors that affect the Defendant's property, such as snow build-up and 
the placement of water tanks. While Ms. Pullos testified she was the sole 
person who determined the location and extent of the taking in this case, 
she testified twice, under cross-examination, that she did not locate the 
taking of the property in a manner which would be most compatible with 
the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
The Court concludes that this failure suggests a level of disregard 
which rises to arbitrariness in locating the proposed turnaround. This, 
in turn, provides sufficient grounds for the Court to deny the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, as that occupancy is currently framed. 
The Court notes that a corollary issue raised by the Defendant is 
whether the purpose of the proposed condemnation meets the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann., § 78-34-4. While it appears that the County could 
potentially meet these requirements, the issue becomes moot because the 
Defendant has a complete defense to the condemnation action. 
Specifically, the County has not acted reasonably or in good faith, as 
evidenced, in part, by its complete failure to consider the standard of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
public good versus private injury in locating the proposed turnaround, 
including failing to weigh other options involving County land, with 
potentially less impact. 
Based on the foregoing, the County's request for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy is denied. Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with, but not limited 
to, this Memorandum Decision. Counsel should include citations to the 
appropriate legal authorities which support this Court's legal 
conclusions. 
1 . /S*. Dated thi day of July, 2 008. 
ROBERT P . FAUST X*%&Wf§& 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE* M ^ f e ^ " /o<?J 
'Ht'RO o*roa 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY V. 
BUTLER, CROCKETT & WALSH PAGE 5 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this lQ day of July, 2008: 
Donald H. Hansen 
David H.T. Wayment 
Deputy District Attorneys 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
John Walsh 
Attorney for Defendant 
3191 S. Valley Street, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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Laurie Ann Fraser 
2529 East 1300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
US. CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Certified Mail Article No. 70Db ILlb DD/3 ^S&p /Jp'tZ* 
and Regular First Class Mail 
Re: CEASE AND DESIST DEMAND 
Trespass on County Road 
Pinecrest Turnaround 
Dear Ms. Fraser: 
This office represents the interests of Salt Lake County ("County") in and to the paved, 
County-maintained area at the intersection of Burrs Lane and Roosevelt Trail (locally known and 
hereafter referred to as the 44turnaround") in the Pinecrest District of Emigration Canyon. It is the 
County's understanding and position that the Utah Third District Court quieted title to the entire 
paved portion of the turnaround, and the entire platted, as well as the used and traveled, portions 
of Burrs Lane below Roosevelt Trail, in the County as a public road in 1992. The County has 
maintained that position continuously since that time. 
This office was recendy informed that within the past two to three weeks, you erected, or 
caused to be erected, a steel chain-link fence across a portion of the paved turnaround, and in so 
doing, you caused damage to the asphalt pavement by digging eleven holes for placement of steel 
fenceposts. It is our further understanding that the fence was in place for less than one week, has 
been removed, and that the holes dug in the asphalt have been temporarily filled with concrete. 
The County regards such actions as trespass and destruction of County property. Accordingly, 
you are hereby instructed to immediately cease and desist the placement of any fence or other 
encroachment upon the County's property at the turnaround. In the event of any future 
JOH00372 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Laurie Frascr 
Re: Pinccrcst Turnaround 
Cease and Desist Letter 
June 21, 2001 
Page 2 
placement by you, or at your behest, of fences or other objects constituting a trespass upon a 
County road dedicated to public use will result in both removal of such object(s) by the County, 
and legal action against you. 
Additionally, you are now required, within thirty (30) days after the date of this letter, to 
repair the holes placed in the asphalt turnaround by removing the concrete from such holes and 
restoring the asphalt surface to its condition prior to your trespass. 
Very tnily yours, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Deputy District Attorney 
Litigation Division 
DHHrdh 
cc: Roger Hillam (County Real Estate) 
Neil Stack (County Engineering) 
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Salt Lake County 
Board of Commissioners 
Jim Bradley CHAIRMAN 
Randy Horiuchi 
Brent Overson 
August 17, 1994 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S. State Street 
Suite N2100 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84190-1000 
Tel (801) 468-3350 
Fax (801) 468-3535 
Mr. David E. Yocom 
County Attorney 
Government Center, South Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attn: Mr. Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy Attorney/Civil Division 
Dear Mr. Lewis: 
The Board of County Commissioners, at its meeting held this day, approved the 
attached Resolution Ho. 2113 in regard to the width of Burr's Lane between the 
second turnaround and Roosevelt Trail. 
The resolution was approved with the following corrections: 
Remove the word "significant" from paragraph 3. to read "No existing trees 
of aignifleant foliage within the traveled Burr's Lane..." 
Insert the number "IS" in paragraph 1. to read *•..between the Second 
Turnaround (traveled surface plus shoulders) shall be 15 feet except as provided 
In paragraph 2.* 
Pursuant to the above, you are hereby authorized to effect same. 
Very truly yours, 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
.£//£ DATE /Justed /7 /Wtf RESOLUTION NO 
A RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, CONCERNING THE WIDTH OF BURR'S LANE BETWEEN THE SECOND 
TURNAROUND AND ROOSEVELT TRAIL-
WHEREAS, Burr's Lane, as it is located on the ground between 
the Second Turnaround (approximately 9000 East) and Roosevelt Trail 
within the Pinecrest area of Emigration Canyon ("Traveled Burr's 
Lane") , is maintained by Salt Lake County as a public road; and 
WHEREAS, issues and conflicts have arisen concerning the width 
of the Traveled Burr's Lane; and 
WHEREAS, in 1983, Salt Lake County entered into a stipulated 
settlement with residents and property owners in the Pinecrest area 
involved in the lawsuit of Walsh, et aL v. Salt Lake County, 
C-82-4633, wherein the County agreed to reconstruct the Traveled 
Burr's Lane immediately below Roosevelt Trail to the width of the 
road existing on the ground prior to its destruction in 1983; and 
WHEREAS, plans prepared by Montgomery Engineering for 
reconstruction of the road show a road 14 feet wide, including two 
foot shoulders on each side (10 foot traveled surface) ; and 
WHEREAS, the canyon road maintenance map enacted in 1984 shows 
the Traveled Burr's Lane north of the turnaround to approximately 
9055 East where the asphalt ends as a 13 foot wide road (this 
measurement was based upon the traveled surface) and the remaining 
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portion of the Traveled Burr's Lane from where the asphalt ends to 
Roosevelt Trail as an IT foot wide road (traveled surface) except 
as modified by the Stipulation; and 
WHEREAS, in places the Traveled Burr's Lane has been widened 
by some property owners over the past few years especially at the 
top end of the road; and 
WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners desires to have 
some consistency in the maximum width of the Traveled Burr's Lane; 
and 
WHEREAS, the Board of County Commissioners has determined that 
in order to retain the rural mountain setting of the area and to 
protect trees, shrubs, and the stream, the road should remain 
narrow; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Board of County Commissioners determines 
as follows: 
1. The Traveled Burr's Lane shall be at a maximum of a 13 
foot wide traveled surface. The total width of the Traveled Burr's 
Lane maintained by the County between the Second Turnaround 
(traveled surface plus shoulders) shall be tp feet except as 
provided in paragraph 2. 
2. The Board of County Commissioners may designate wider 
pull-off and passing areas after receiving a recommendation from 
the Public Works Department. 
3. No existing trees or j»lijniaiXJlU-U foliage within the 
Traveled Burr's Lane (total width) shall be removed without the 
specific approval of the Board of County Commissioners. 
2 
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4. The Board of County Commissioners may make future changes 
in the width of the Traveled Burr's Lane it deems necessary for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the residents in the area and other 
users of the Traveled Burr's Lane. 
5. Any adjacent property owner or other person desiring to 
landscape or otherwise encroach upon property within the Traveled 
Burr's Lane must receive written permission from the Board of 
County Commissioners. Any person desiring to maintain, grade, 
snowplow, salt or excavate within the Traveled Burr's Lane or to 
widen the Traveled Burr's Lane must receive written permission from 
the Board of County Commissioners. Any person desiring to place, 
keep, or maintain upon or across any part of the Traveled Burr's 
Lane or the Dedicated Burr's Lane any materials including, but not 
limited to, dirt, roadbase, refuse, rocks, fill or other building 
materials, must obtain written permission from the Board of County 
Commissioners. Failure to comply with these requirements will be 
considered violations of the ordinances of Salt Lake County and 
after proper investigation will be referred to the County Attorney 
for prosecution. The Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake County 
Department of Public Works, and Development Services Division are 
by this resolution required to enforce its terms and requirements 
and immediately report any violation. 
6. The boundaries of the Traveled Burr's Lane width shall be 
determined by the Public Works Department in conjunction with the 
Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office and clearly marked and defined 
where necessary. 
3 
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7. This resolution reaffirms the width of Burr's Lane as it 
exists on the ground and is not intended to affect the status of 
the 33 foot wide Dedicated Burr's Lane which is located in the same 
general area and overlaps in some locations the road on the ground. 
By this resolution the County is not abandoning any claim to the 33 
foot Dedicated Burr's Lane. The County will continue to have the 
right but not the obligation to make use of the 33 foot dedicated 
road. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED this JI / / day of 
1994 
ATTEST: 
"-"Bait Lake County Clerk 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Chairman 
an.tt.burrrcs2.kil 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Salt Lake Countyattorn*** O«o. 
ay 
Dais: . W&&&L 
n 
) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY Or SALT LAKE 
I. THE UNDERSIGNED. OCPUTY COUNTY < 
CLERK OF THE BOARD Of COUNTY COMMIBOIQNEJU) Of 
SALT LAKE COUNTY UTAH. DO H S O Y CERTIFY THAT THE 
ANNEXEO AND FOREGOING IS A TRUE ANDFUUCOPYOF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN MY OPfVGi Aft SUCH 
CLERK 7 ^ 
WITNESg MYlHAND AND THE SEAL Of ftAttOOUNTV < , , 
THIS IrW)AVQP ZUt^^f- *W 
SHERRIESWENSEN 
3\ 
COMmSSiOKCLSM. \/j/ teafifLama* Us; 
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